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Abstract 
Despite the well-documented hardship caused by demonetization policy 
implemented on 8th November 2016 in India, the large scale public support 
and acceptance of it was puzzling. Was this acceptance a silent protest to 
punish those with ill-gotten wealth and an aversion towards the growing 
inequality in the country?  
Motivated by this ambiguity, this thesis attempts to understand the 
demonetization acceptance as being in line with the research in experimental 
economics and experimental psychology that argues that notions such as 
inequity aversion and fairness drives human behaviour into taking decisions 
which are not economically rational. More specifically, the study will examine 
the role of social preferences and fairness in an economic agents’ behaviour.  
The research paper designs a “money-burning” experiment in a field 
setting in India and attempts to mimic the acquisition of money through unfair 
means (black money) and thereafter offers participants a chance to punish each 
other (reduce each other’s money at a cost to themselves). The study finds a 
balanced support for both, self-interest behaviour and fairness preference.  
Empirically, the study did not find any link between the burning behaviour and 
demonetization acceptance.  
Keywords 
Social preferences, money burning, fairness, procedural fairness, experimental 
economics, demonetization, India. 
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DeMo by NaMo (Demonetization by Narendra Modi)  
Money burning in India 
 
1 Introduction 
In an address to the nation, on the evening of November 8th, 2016, the Prime 
Minister of India, Narendra Modi decreed that from midnight, 86 percent of 
India’s currency amounting to Indian Rupees (INR) 14.18 lakh crore (trillion) 
would be demonetized, that is, it would no longer be legal tender. The 
demonetized currencies were the Rupee 500 and 1000 note bills. At the same 
time, new Rupee 2000 and Rupee 500 bills were to be issued. 
Ostensibly, as stated by the Prime Minister (PMO 2016), the policy was 
primarily directed towards “breaking the grip of corruption and black 
money”.1Indeed, in his speech of November 8th, 2016, the Prime Minister used 
the phrase “black money” 18 times while only peripherally mentioning other 
goals of demonetization, for example to reduce terrorism and tackle the 
problem of fake currency.2 In addition, several government spokespersons, 
including the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Urjit Patel, argued 
that demonetization would aid the country’s fight against terrorism and help 
India “leapfrog into a less cash-use economy at par with more developed 
nations” (Business Insider 2016). While arguing that the main aim of the policy 
was to tackle corruption and black money, the Prime Minister and other 
spokespersons acknowledged the short-term hardships but at the same time 
pointed out that the policy would inflict greater pain on black money hoarders 
(PMO 2016).The speeches pointed at the country’s enormous wealth 
disparities and attributed them to corruption and unfairly acquired black 
wealth. The policy was portrayed as a heroic action and a “war on corruption” 
and in later speeches, citizens experiencing hardships were compared to 
soldiers at the frontlines of combat (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik 2017: 
5). 
Despite the various motives provided by the government for introducing 
the policy, the logic of demonetization has been critically analysed and 
questioned by many economists and scholars. For instance, Amartya Sen calls 
it “Authoritarianism at Its Best” (Usmani 2016). Kaushik Basu, Senior Vice-
President and Chief Economist at the World Bank criticized the policy for its 
poor design (Iyengar 2016). In another critical evaluation of demonetisation, 
                                                 
1 Black Money is money “which is not fully legitimate in the hands of owner -for two 
possible reason”. One reason is that the black money may have been generated from 
illegitimate activities like ‘crime, drugtrade, terrorism and corruption’. The second 
reason is that it may have been generated by ‘failing to pay the dues to the exchequer 
in one form or the other’-(Ministry of Finance 2012:1). 
2 In later speeches, there was a shift towards invoking the aim of boosting the digital 
economy as an additional reason for demonetization.  
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Ghosh, Chandrashekhar, and Patnaik (2017) view the policy in a political 
context and have argued that the policy was politically driven and was a bold 
move to win popular support before elections in India’s most populous state, 
Uttar Pradesh. On the other side, while a minority, there are economists and 
scholars who have praised the policy and argued in favour of it. Economist, 
Kenneth Rogoff called it a “bold and audacious move for a country with 
endemic corruption”. Former Indian representative to the IMF and economist, 
Arvind Virmani, viewed the policy as a “useful method of flushing out black 
money” (Iyengar 2016). 
Regardless of the aims of the policy, its announcement and 
implementation took the country by shock and led to large-scale disruptions in 
economic activity. At the time that demonetization was announced, more than 
95 per cent of all economic transactions were estimated to be in cash, and the 
immediate effect of the currency withdrawal was felt in the form of a 
commerce freeze. Farmers faced difficulties in making payments for seeds and 
fertilizers and the effects of the policy were most visible in the informal sector 
(Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik 2017: 5).3 Furthermore, the lack of proper 
planning, for example, new notes had not yet been printed in sufficient 
numbers and ATM machines had not been recalibrated according to the new 
size of the currency, led to extended cash shortages in banks and ATMs which 
further resulted in government mandated restrictions on cash withdrawals. The 
bewilderment about being unable to access one’s own savings and limits on the 
amount of money that may be withdrawn led to long queues outside banks and 
ATMs.  
Surprisingly, despite the slow-down in economic activity and the 
inconvenience, the public’s reaction to demonetisation was broadly positive. 
Opinion surveys conducted soon after the announcement of the policy showed 
that despite expressing dissatisfaction at the way in which it was implemented, 
on average, 70 to 80 per cent of the public favoured demonetisation.4 
In part, this paper is motivated by the puzzle that despite the hardship and 
inconvenience caused by the policy, it enjoyed, and perhaps still enjoys 
widespread acceptance. Why? Did the country’s citizens buy into the 
arguments advanced by the Prime Minister and other spokespersons? In other 
words is it part of the new brand of “nationalism” that expects people to make 
“sacrifices” for the greater good of the nation (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and 
                                                 
3 Informal sector forms about 69% and 75% of urban and rural employment 
respectively and wages are paid in cash. 
4 An infographic put out on the Prime Minister’s website claimed that 93 percent of 
half a million people who took the survey on the Narendra Modi app supported 
demonetization (The Times of India 2016). Another international polling agency, C-
voter, conducted a survey across 252 parliamentary constituencies and nearly 86 per 
cent of the respondents living in urban and rural areas said the “inconvenience caused 
by demonetisation was worth the effort of combating black money”. Nearly 87 
percent of respondents felt the move was hurting those with black money (The Times of 
India 2016).  
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Patnaik 2017).Was the rhetoric of the Prime Minister which portrayed 
acceptance and support for demonetisation as one’s patriotic duty, and 
subjecting the move to any rational examination as anti-national and support 
for the corrupt and the criminal, successful? Was the government’s, so called, 
grand persuasion strategy, that is, arguing that demonetization would have a 
much larger negative effect on those who had acquired unfair wealth while 
having a much smaller effect on the common man successful? Were the Prime 
Minister and his team successfully able to exploit human emotions and tap 
into, by design or unwittingly, the idea of schadenfreude– that is, the experience 
of self-satisfaction that comes from learning of the troubles of others? 
The idea that the acceptance of demonetisation maybe attributed to 
notions of fairness and a desire to punish those who have acquired wealth 
through unfair means is echoed in recent research in experimental economics 
and experimental psychology. This body of work argues and demonstrates that 
rather than self-interest, people are motivated by notions of fairness and willing 
to sacrifice their own wealth and accept losses in order to ensure fair 
outcomes. For instance, in a laboratory setting where participants are invited to 
share resources or contribute to a common pool of funds, Güth et al. (1982) 
and Fehr and Gächter (2000), among other papers, show that participants 
reject offers or punish the perpetrator even at a cost to themselves when they 
perceive that an act has been unfair to them.5 Furthermore, Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) show that participants are willing to spend resources to punish 
deviations from equal division, even when they themselves do not suffer from 
these deviations. In related work, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) hypothesise that people are willing to pay money in order to 
avoid unequal payoff distributions (inequity aversion behaviour) and provide 
extensive experimental data to support their theory. Experimental evidence 
suggests that such behaviours are driven by strong feelings of envy or concerns 
for fairness and reciprocity.  
Motivated by the support for demonetisation and the recent work in 
experimental economics and psychology, this thesis designs a “money-
burning” experiment to understand and explore human emotions and 
behaviour when faced with both unfair processes and unequal monetary 
outcomes. The experiment which takes place in a field setting in New Delhi 
and nine villages in the state of Uttar Pradesh, as opposed to a laboratory 
setting, attempts to mimic the acquisition of money through unfair means 
(black money) and thereafter offers participants a chance to punish each other 
(reduce each other’s money at a cost to themselves).While details are described 
later in the text, the experiment is carried out with individuals belonging to five 
different socio-economic groups. In total the experiment consisted of fifty 
sessions with four participants in each session. In addition to the experiment, a 
                                                 
5 The ultimatum game is played by a proposer and a responder. The proposer is 
endowed with a sum of money, and proposes a division of the sum between herself 
and the responder. The responder either accepts the division or rejects, in which case 
both receive nothing. 
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brief survey was also carried out with the same participants, in order to gather 
demographic information and the subjects’ opinions on demonetisation.  
Specifically, this thesis has three main objectives. The first objective is to 
test whether individuals are sufficiently averse to unequal financial outcomes 
that they are willing to pay (burn) some of their own money to reduce the 
amount of money held by others. The second objective is to see whether the 
willingness to reduce other’s money, if any, is intensified, when the unequal 
financial outcome is due to the result of an unfair procedure as opposed to an 
unequal outcome albeit as a result of a fair process. The third objective is to 
see whether there is any link between the desire to sacrifice one’s own money 
to inflict greater pain on others and acceptance of demonetisation in India.  
The research paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
on social preferences and explains inequality aversion theory. Chapter 3 
introduces the research methodology of the study and the research hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 presents the experimental data and provides a descriptive analysis of 
the results. Chapter 5 reports and discuss the results and Chapter 6 concludes.  
2 Literature review 
Traditional economic models and in particular neo-classical choice theory is 
based on the assumption that economic agents (individuals, firms) act 
rationally and are motivated by self-interest. In other words, when faced with 
alterative courses of action, homo economicus will choose the alternative that will 
maximize his or her own income/wealth and expect others to do the same 
(Mathis and Steffen, 2015: 31). However, in recent years, a considerable body 
of experimental evidence has questioned the pure self-interest behaviour of 
individuals and pointed out that individuals do not always make decisions 
which are consistent with maximizing their resources. Instead, people also care 
about the payoffs (outcomes) of other members in a group (or other 
individuals) when evaluating their well-being and also care about how 
outcomes are achieved (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2000; 
Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002).6 Rather than being driven only by self-
interest, these studies suggest that people exhibit social preferences, that is, 
they are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness, equity, trust, reciprocity, 
                                                 
6 The scrutiny of the standard economic assumptions of self-interest and rational 
decision-making has led to a new strand of research falling under the rubric, 
Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Through its multi-disciplinary approach, 
behavioural economics aims to provide a better and more accurate understanding of 
what motivates people’s behaviour and actions. Behavioural models typically integrate 
insights from psychology, neuroscience and microeconomics theory. Although the 
difference between Behavioural and Experimental Economics is not clear but some 
authors argue that Behavioural Economics focuses on individual behaviour and 
Experimental Economics is more concerned with the results of interpersonal 
interaction (Kapeliushnikov, 2015: 83). 
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altruism and their decisions are also driven by emotions such as envy, spite, 
and guilt.7 
The aim of this chapter is to review the existing literature on theoretical 
models and experimental evidence that challenges the self-interest hypothesis 
and examines social preferences. Since, the objective of this thesis is to 
examine and test individual’s preferences for fairness (including procedural 
fairness) and aversion to unequal outcomes, the review is restricted only to 
related models and evidence.  
2.1 Social preferences 
The strong commitment to self-interest as a decision-making principle has 
come under serious scrutiny since experimental economists began studying 
human behaviour in laboratory settings. Typically, researchers’ set-up 
experiments/games with college students as participants and analyse their 
behaviour in a laboratory setting. While details are discussed below, examples 
of such experiments/games include ultimatum games (Güth, Schmittberger, 
and Schwarze, 1982; Slonim and Roth, 1998), dictator games (Forsythe, 
Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994; Andreoni and Miller, 2002), investment 
games (Cox, 2004), public goods games (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), joy of 
destruction game and money burning games (Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo and Oswald, 
2001; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink, and Herrmann, 2011). 
Drawing on the empirical findings of these laboratory experiments, new 
theoretical models have been developed, not so much as to challenge standard 
economic theory rather but to expand it and to provide a psychological 
expansion (Graziano, 2015: 202). This chapter mimics the development of the 
field and first presents the literature on the empirical findings and then the 
theoretical models that have been developed to explain the findings.   
Experimental evidence of social preferences 
An important experimental game that challenged the self-interest hypothesis 
was the so-called ultimatum game designed by Güth, Schmittberger and 
Schwarze (1982). The experiment was conducted with economics graduate 
students. It is a simple two player game, played by a proposer and a responder. 
The proposer receives a sum of money and offers a division of the money 
between himself and the responder (recipient). The responder can either accept 
or reject the offer. If he accepts, the sum is divided as agreed and in case he 
rejects, both players receive nothing. As per the canonical rational-choice 
approach, a self-interested proposer should offer the minimum positive 
amount and a self-interested responder should accept any non-zero amount 
(since zero is better than nothing). However, in the study by Güth et al. (1982), 
                                                 
7Reciprocity means that people are willing to reward friendly actions and punish 
hostile actions, even though these rewards or punishments causes a net reduction in 
material payoff of those who reward or punished (Guth et al., 1982 ) and Altruism 
means the self-less concern for the welfare of others.  
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proposers offered non-zero amounts and the responders rejected positive 
offers. Variants of this basic ultimatum game have been tested in a variety of 
contexts with different age groups, different cultural settings, variations in the 
amount of money and the length of the game (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; 
Oosterbeek et al., 2004). A meta-analysis of ultimatum games (Oosterbeek et 
al., 2004) which included findings from 37 papers with 75 results showed that, 
on average, proposers offered about 40 percent and, on average, offers below 
16 percent of the available amount were rejected. One drawback of this meta-
analysis was that the researchers had to exclude a large number of studies in 
which subjects play some variations of the ultimatum game.8 However, 
Tisserand (2014) took into account this consideration and conducted another 
meta-analysis with the complete data. The study reviewed 97 observations of 
the game in 42 articles. Their study also found similar results. The average 
offer by proposers was 41 per cent and responders rejected offers which were 
below 20 per cent of the available surplus. The evidence from these reviews of 
the ultimatum games supports the idea that it is not always maximization of 
financial outcomes or relative payoffs which drives human behaviour, but 
notions such as fairness and equity also matter. 
Similarly, to study fairness in individual interactions Kahneman, Knetsch 
and Thaler (1986) introduced an experiment called the dictator game. The 
dictator game is based on the same principle as that of the ‘ultimatum game’ 
but with one difference. The dictator (who divides the money) gets to freely 
decide how much of an initial sum of money, he/she would like to the other 
player. But now, the responder/recipient has to accept the offer and cannot 
harm the dictator by refusing the offer. In other words, in the dictator game 
the dictator’s (proposer) outcome depends only on his own actions. While in 
an ultimatum game, the responder can reject the offer in which case the 
proposer gets nothing. Standard economic theory would predict that the 
dictator will always make the most self-interested choice and allocate the entire 
money to him/her and will give zero money to the responder. The experiment 
was first conducted with students (N=161) in an undergraduate psychology 
class at Cornell University.  It turned out that of 161 subjects, 122 subjects (76 
per cent) divided the money equally suggesting a preference for fairness and 
equitable distribution. A meta-analysis of dictator games carried out by Engel 
(2011) which included 129 papers and 616 experimental treatments found that, 
on average, dictators gave away 28 percent of their endowment.9The null 
hypothesis that the giving rate is 0 was handily rejected (z = 35.44 (p <.0001)). 
                                                 
8 For instance papers which reported one-sided uncertainty. The responder gets to 
know the probability distribution of offers rather than the exact offer or, as in the 
strategy design, no offer at all. Examples are Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) and 
Rapoport and Sundali (1996). 
9 The author also undertook a random effect meta-analysis with 445 treatments for 
which standard errors were reported or could be reconstructed. The result matched 
the un-weighted grand mean, with give rate of 28.3 per cent. However, in the result 
from the fixed effect meta-analysis, the estimated give rate dropped to 20.4 percent 
(Engel 2011). 
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Only 36 percent of dictators behaved in the manner suggested by conventional 
economic theory and exhibited pure self-interest by giving zero money to the 
recipient. 17 percent chose an equal split, indicating that self-interest is not 
pervasive and individuals do care about other’s payoff as well. As many as 5 
per cent gave the recipient everything (reflecting altruism) and the remainder, 
42 percent, parted with a portion of their endowment (Engel 2011).  
Similar behaviour, that is behaviour which is not entirely consistent with 
maximizing self-interest, is also observed in other strategic games. For 
instance, in “public good” games, when punishment is introduced, people 
punish free-riders more and are reluctant to punish those who co-operate 
(Ertan, Page, and Putterman’s 2009)10.  In addition to the desire for equitable 
outcomes, a related body of work suggests that “procedural justice” that is 
fairness in the manner in which an outcome has been reached also influences 
people’s actions (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Brockner and Wisenfeld, 1996). Lind 
and Tyler (1988) explore the implications of judgement about procedural 
fairness in different settings (not only with the students in the lab setting). For 
instance, one of their researches involved interviews with Chicago residents 
who had an earlier encounter with the police and the court. The groups were 
divided into people who had received favourable or unfavourable outcomes 
and then further disaggregated as to whether they felt that the outcome had 
resulted from a fair or unfair process. The study reported that the subjects who 
perceived the procedure as positive remained positive about the decision even 
with unfavourable outcomes. Echoing this view, Bolton et al. (2005: 1071), 
concludes that “the opportunity for a fair procedure has much the same effect 
on the acceptability of a given allocation as does the opportunity to have a fair 
outcome. Results produced by an unbiased procedure tend to be more 
acceptable than those produced by unfair procedures”. Similarly, various 
experiments also supported the view that procedural fairness matters along 
with relative payoffs or outcomes (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Ruffle, 1998). 
In contrast to the studies on so called pro-social preferences, as is 
discussed in the next sub-section, a growing body of literature also focuses on 
the negative aspects of social preferences.  
Experimental evidence of anti-social preferences 
As opposed to the literature which focuses on social preferences, a body of 
work purports to examine negative preferences like envy or the “dark side of 
human nature” (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Abbink, Masclet and van Veelen, 
2011).  Experiments like money burning games and joy-of-destruction games 
have been introduced with the motive of capturing this “anti-social” 
behaviour.  
                                                 
10 In public goods game, a group of players receive some initial money, which they can 
invest covertly into a common pool, entirely or in parts. The examiner will double the 
invested amount and subsequently distribute it among all the participants equally. A 
rational economic agent should not contribute anything to the common pool. 
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For instance, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) introduced money burning game 
with the underlying idea of being “able to parameterize the nature of envy”.11 
They conducted an experiment with 116 students (and other college staff) over 
29 sessions. Participants were initially endowed with an equal sum of money. 
They were then allowed to increase their money through 10 rounds of betting 
on a number (1, 2, or 3) that was randomly chosen by a computer. The aim of 
the betting stage was to create an unequal distribution of income in the group. 
Two of the four players in each group were favoured and could bet more than 
the others in each round of the betting stage, and in addition, received a cash 
bonus between betting and burning stages. In the final round, players were 
asked to burn each other’s earnings, at a price to themselves of 0.01, 0.02, 0.05 
and 0.25 per money unit burnt. 62.5 per cent of the participants chose to burn 
money of others (even at a cost to themselves). Based on this finding the 
authors concluded that “agents display negative preferences” such as envy. In a 
later paper, Zizzo (2003), repeated the experiment, but in this case only one 
random decision was chosen from all the burning decisions made by 
participants (after all subjects had made their burning decision). Almost 50 
percent of the subjects engaged in burning money. This finding was again 
interpreted as a display of envious preferences.  
While evidence of money burning is interpreted as anti-social preferences 
the difference between this strand of the literature and the literature which 
argues in favour of social preferences is not very clear. The main motive of all 
these studies is the same, that is, to question the pure self-interest behaviour of 
individuals and point out that the individuals do not always make decisions 
which are consistent with maximizing their resources. Some of the observed 
behaviour in experiments which attempt to examine social and anti-social 
preferences may have similar explanations. For instance, in an ultimatum game, 
an individual may reject an offer out of pure envy an anti-social trait as 
opposed to a social preference for “fairness”. Similarly, in a dictator game, a 
dictator may offer the entire or non-zero amount which may be motivated by 
altruism or fairness or may offer zero money which may be motivated by envy 
or evil. Similarly, in money burning games, an individual may burn money to 
decrease inequality and unfairness as opposed to the anti-social preference –
“envy”. 
In the “money burning” game conducted by Zizzo and Oswald (2001), the 
experimenter deliberately created procedural unfairness in the game. Two of 
the four players received favourable treatment in the game. In the betting 
stage, these players could bet more than the others in each round and in the 
next stage the same two players also received a cash bonus. It is likely that the 
subjects who did not receive any advantage want to create a fair and equal 
distribution of endowment and therefore they engage in burning. It was not 
clear how the experiment aimed to measure the extent of negative 
interdependence, or parameterize the degree of “envy”, which was the 
objective of the paper. At the end of the experiment, the authors included a 
                                                 
11 Since our study is inspired by this paper, we are describing their experiment and 
finding in details. 
15 
 
complementary questionnaire with the intention of “understanding the 
motivation behind the participants’ decision”. However, the results of this 
questionnaire were not included in the paper which makes it difficult to 
interpret burning as a consequence of envy or a concern for fairness or both.12 
Indeed, their paper concludes by arguing that two factors shape negative 
preferences, procedural fairness and “reciprocity”, and both these factors are 
discussed extensively in the “social preferences” literature.  
Regardless of whether one argues that these papers provide evidence of 
social or anti-social preferences, the literature clearly shows that there is 
substantial variation in human behaviour. There is some support for self-
interested behaviour and at the same time support for altruistic behaviour or a 
desire for fairness and also behaviour motivated by envy.13 Henrich et al. 
(2004) summarize many experiments in cross-cultural settings and conclude, 
“Over the past decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically 
falsified the textbook representation of homo economicus, with hundreds of 
experiments that have suggested that people care not only about their own 
material payoffs but also about such things as fairness, equity, and reciprocity.” 
One reason for the increasing interest in such experiments is that in 
principal, it provides “ceteris paribus observations of motivated individual 
economic agents, which are otherwise exceptionally difficult to obtain using 
conventional econometric techniques” (Levitt and List, 2007:153).  By the late 
nineties, inspired by these experimental results and evidences, new preference 
models started to evolve such as Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aversion 
model, or Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000) theory of Equity, Reciprocity and 
Competition (ERC), Adreoni and Miller’s (2002) approach to altruism and 
Charness and Rabin’s (2000) Rawlsian social welfare preferences. The next 
section will discuss two such theoretical models which attempt to explain the 
empirical findings in some detail.  
2.2 Theoretical models of social preferences 
A number of theoretical models have been suggested to reconcile the results 
emerging from the experimental evidence. Broadly, these models fall into two 
categories (Fehr and Schmidt, 2001:11). One set of models is concerned with 
distributional payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) 
and another set of models which deals with “intention based reciprocity” 
(Charness and Rabin, 2000) which assumes that players care about the 
intention of their opponents. Since, the objective of this thesis is to look at the 
nature of distributional payoffs the focus is on the first set of models, in 
particular, the work of Fehr and Schimdt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000).  
                                                 
12 The reason for excluding these results is not stated in their paper. 
13 In public goods game, a group of players receive some initial money, which they can 
invest covertly into a common pool, entirely or in parts. The examiner will double the 
invested amount and subsequently distribute it among all the participants equally. A 
rational economic agent should not contribute anything to the common pool. 
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The inequity-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is considered a 
major theoretical contribution to fairness studies. Their paper defines inequity-
aversion as a phenomenon where “people resist inequitable outcomes” and 
want to achieve an equitable distribution of material resources, even at a cost 
to themselves. The Fehr and Schmidt utility function has the following form: 
  
Ui(x) = xi - αi max (xj – xi, 0) - βi max (xi– xj, 0),   i ≠ j,   
 
where individual i’s utility is increasing in his/her endowment of x and a 
decreasing function of the difference between his/her endowment and the 
endowment of individual j. The utility function of their model divides the 
inequity parameter into disadvantageous inequity (a component that harms 
oneself) and advantageous inequity (a component that harms others). The 
second term on the right-hand-side of their utility function (αi) measures the 
utility loss from disadvantageous inequity (envy) and the third term (βi) indicate 
utility loss from advantageous inequity (guilt/discomfort). Their utility function 
assumes that disadvantageous inequity is stronger than the advantageous 
inequity (βi<αi) and influences people to willingly sacrifice their own resources 
to ensure relatively better off or fair outcomes. The theoretical results of this 
model are consistent with experimental results from a variety of games 
(ultimatum games, public goods game).  
However, the inequity aversion model has been criticized for not taking 
into account intentions in the utility function. That is, the model does not 
provide any understanding of why and when people exhibit social preferences. 
Also, since this model is “outcome based”, it ignores the fundamental role of 
procedures, both in the theoretical model and the related experiments (Bergh 
2008).  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who refined the earlier work of Bolton 
(1991), also follow a similar approach in their inequity-averse utility function 
but there are some differences in their model. Unlike the model by Fehr and 
Schmidt where the participants compare the absolute differences, in Bolton 
and Ockenfels’s model, subjects compare their material payoff to the material 
average payoff of the group. For many experiments, both these models reach 
the same or similar conclusions. For instance, Fehr and Schmidt’s model 
explain the results in ultimatum, dictator, trust and gift-exchange games (Korth 
2009: 22).14 Similarly, ERC model of Bolton and Ockenfel, also explains the 
results of rejections in ultimatum games and giving in dictator and gift-
exchange games. Some authors have argued that the measure of inequality is 
more appropriate in Fehr and Schmidt’s model, since ERC theory is based on 
the average payoff and thus it cannot explain the behaviour dependent on 
inequities among other players (Korth 2009: 22).  
                                                 
14 However, since this model do not take into account intentions, the model fails to 
explain why people behave differently when playing against a random device instead 
of a real player, or why low offers in a best-shot game are more readily accepted than 
in an ultimatum game (Korth 2009 : 22) 
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One critical underlying assumption that constitutes the essence of such 
models and laboratory experiments is that the insights gained from them can 
be extrapolated to the outside world, a principle denoted as “generalizability” 
by Levitt and List (2007: 153).  However, some authors argue that the 
laboratory settings lack generalizability as they are based on homogeneous 
subject pools or lack of real-world credibility due to “artificial conditions” of 
the laboratory (List 2007).  In the next section, we discuss some shortcoming 
of the laboratory experiments and whether it translates the lab behaviour into 
insights about the field/outside lab behaviours.  
2.3 From lab to real world behaviour 
A fundamental question in experimental economics is whether laboratory 
based experimental evidence may be generalized to the outside world.  Levitt 
and List (2007:154), in their seminal paper, argue that behaviour in laboratory 
experiments is not just influenced by monetary considerations but many other 
factors, they write, “the presence of moral and ethical considerations, the 
nature and extent of scrutiny of one’s action by others, the context in which 
decision is embedded, self-selection of the individuals making decisions and 
lastly the stakes of the games”, influence the decision to share and the amount 
to share. Their study suggests a utility function of the form: 
 
Ui (a, ν, n, s) = Mi (a, ν, n, s) + Wi(a, ν),   
 
where a utility-maximizing individual i is faced with a choice regarding a 
single action a. A dictator’s utility depends on two components, Mi, which is 
the dictator’s moral payoff and Wi the dictator’s wealth. In the absence of a 
moral component, the model is standard wealth maximization. However, when 
a moral payoff is associated with Wi, an individual may deviate from wealth 
maximization and take an action that lowers the moral cost. A dictator’s moral 
payoff (Mi), decreases as the monetary stake ν grows (although, not always); 
increase with n social norms or rules and will depend on the extent of scrutiny 
s. Greater the degree of scrutiny, larger the deviation from wealth 
maximization action towards an action with lower moral cost (Levitt and List, 
2007: 157).  
Contrary to behaviour in laboratory experiments, real-world behaviour 
may differ on dimensions like monetary stakes, social norms or scrutiny. For 
instance, stakes in lab experiments are usually very small as compared to large-
scale stakes such as in financial markets. Similarly, real world behaviour may be 
completely different from the one in the lab where an individual is aware that 
their behaviour is being monitored and scrutinized (Levitt and List, 2007).  
Furthermore, individual behaviour in a laboratory setting appears to be 
sensitive to small changes in the experimental design and as Levitt and List 
(2007) put it “the context of the experiment matters in their behaviour”.  For 
instance, Haley and Fessler’s (2005) study shows that a simple manipulation 
like showing a pair of eyes on the computer screen of the dictator significantly 
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increases giving in a dictator game from 55 percent in the control group to 88 
percent in the eye-spot treatment. In addition to these factors, the distribution 
and allocation of the initial endowment also makes a big difference to 
behaviour. For instance, Cherry et al. (2002) find that dictators, who earned the 
money/assets with effort, transfer nothing in the dictator games. However, 
when the endowment was randomly determined and allocated by the 
experimenter, the concern for fairness motivated the other regarding behaviour 
and resulted in some transfers. Bardsley (2008) in his study shows that a simple 
manipulation of the action set by giving many options to the dictator or 
proposers also has an effect on individual’s behaviour. When the participants 
were given the opportunity to give money, give nothing, or take money from 
the respondent, the individuals consistently gave less (close to zero). This could 
be either due to a “framing” effect or given the many options, the subjects use 
different reasoning patterns – “Subjects might perceive dictator games as being 
about giving, since they can either do nothing or give, and so ask themselves 
how much to give. Whilst the taking game... might appear to be about taking 
for analogous reasons, so subjects ask themselves how much to take” 
(Bardsley, 2008: 128).15 The study suggested that economic analysis should not 
exclude “context-specific social norms” (Bardsley, 2008: 1).   
There are a few important points to be drawn from this section of the 
review. First, the context of the experiment matters and perhaps more 
pertinently, contrary to behaviour in laboratory experiments, real-life behaviour 
may differ.  Therefore, it is very important to recognize and understand these 
details in the experiment and how changes in the set-up of an experiment may 
induce the behaviour of participants. A proper understanding of the properties 
of context and details in the experiment can minimize such biases.  
Furthermore, understanding the sign and magnitudes of these biases can result 
in more accurate interpretation of the findings from lab experiments and 
therefore, more accurate generalization to outside the lab behaviour.  
This thesis sets out to understand how humans behave, when they are 
faced with unfair procedures in reaching a final outcome. The thesis is based 
on a “money burning” game which is similar to Zizzo and Oswald (2001). 
However, there are some notable differences.  
First, it is different in terms of “choice of subjects” engaging in the game. 
In most of the existing experimental work the participants are college students. 
Sear (1986:527), in his study, mentioned that there are chances that the results 
from these experiments are biased as college students have “incompletely 
formulated senses of self, rather un-crystallised socio-political attitudes, 
unusually strong cognitive skills, strong needs for peer approval, tendencies to 
be compliant to authority, quite unstoppable group relationships, little material 
self-interest in public affairs, and unusual egocentricity”. To overcome these 
                                                 
15 Framing effect, one of the cognitive bias, describes that presenting the same option 
in different formats can alter people's decision making and choice behavior. (Plous, 1993)  
In his paper, Bardsely (2008)  also explained this as “Hawthorne” effect, which might 
be interpreted as “subjects reacting to the experimental demand characteristics”, 
meaning the cues the protocol supplies about appropriate behaviour. 
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shortcomings, the subjects in this money burning game are not students but 
individuals (males and females), from five different socio-economic groups in 
the age group 18 to 60. The use of these different groups provides an 
opportunity to examine whether the results from money burning games are 
restricted to a particular demographic group or maybe more widely generalized. 
Second, most of the “money burning” games have been conducted in a 
lab setting.16 As far as I am aware, there is only one paper (Kebede and Zizzo 
2015), which uses a variation of a money burning game in a field setting of 
rural villages in Ethiopia. The total sample in their experiment was 360 players, 
out of which 120 were students and 240 players were farmers. In contrast, this 
paper runs the experiment in a field setting in urban and rural locations in 
India and as mentioned earlier, works with a diverse subject pool in terms of 
age, education and employment.  
In addition to the experiment, the thesis also includes results from a post-
experiment questionnaire which permits a greater understanding of the 
motivation behind the burning decision (if any).  
Finally, the paper was inspired by real world events, that is, 
demonetization in India, and attempts to link the findings from the experiment 
and insights derived on human behaviour to political decision-making. The 
next chapter explains the research methodology in a detailed manner and sets 
out the research hypotheses.  
3 Research methodology and hypotheses 
This chapter explains the three methodological strategies used in this study and 
sets out the hypotheses that the study aims to test. First and the main strategy 
is to design a “money burning” experiment to understand and explore human 
emotions and behaviour when faced with both unfair process and unequal 
monetary outcomes. The second strategy comprises of a brief questionnaire to 
obtain complementary information on the experiment and document some 
data on the demonetisation policy. The third strategy uses econometric analysis 
to evaluate the robustness of the experimental results and to links the results of 
the experiment to real life policy acceptance. The three strategies along with 
the hypotheses are described in detail in the next section. 
3.1 Money burning experiment 
Experiment overview 
The money-burning experiment was executed in a field setting (a pen and 
paper format) in New Delhi and nine villages in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The 
average time per session was 40-45 minutes. The instructions of the 
experiment were given in the local language Hindi, and the English translation 
of the experiment is attached in Annexure (A). A participation fee of Rs. 100 
                                                 
16 Abbink and Sadrieh (2009); Zizzo and Oswald (2001); Zizzo(2003) 
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was given to all the participants at the end of experiment.17 The experiment 
was conducted using fake plastic currency (Picture 1 
Fake plastic currency used in the experiment but with clear instructions to the 
participants that the amount will be converted into real money (Indian Rupees) 
at the end of the session.  
The data sample was divided into rural and urban samples. A total of 50 
sessions were conducted. 200 subjects participated in the experiment, with four 
subjects per session. Out of the total 50 sessions - 24 sessions (96 subjects) 
were performed in the metropolitan city of New Delhi and the remaining 26 
sessions (104 subjects) were conducted in nine rural villages in the state of 
Uttar Pradesh in India.  
Due to anonymity concerns, the first five sessions were dropped from the 
full data sample. To elaborate, in the first five sessions, subjects made their 
burning decisions in the presence of other participants in the room. However, 
in order to ensure anonymity of their decision, in later sessions, a slight change 
was made. Each individual was taken to a slightly distant area or a different 
room, one at a time, where they were asked to write down their burning 
decisions. Due to this difference in approach and the possibility that in the first 
five sessions anonymity may have been compromised, these five sessions are 
dropped from the full data sample. Thus, the working sample in this thesis is 
45 sessions with 180 participants. 
Details of the data and location are provided in the next chapter. In each 
session, subjects were allotted a unique id in the form of an alphabet (A, B, C, 
and D).  
The experiment began with an initial task based endowment stage where 
each subject was given a chance to earn an endowment based on a simple task. 
The second stage, a betting stage was introduced with the purpose of creating 
an unequal wealth distribution but through a fair process. After the betting 
stage, additional money, gift money, was given to two “randomly” chosen 
subjects in each session. The advantaged subjects were always A and C, but as 
far as the other participants were concerned A and C were randomly chosen. 
This stage was designed to introduce inequality in the wealth distribution 
through an unfair process. The idea was to induce the notion of “black 
money”. The fourth stage was the burning stage where subjects could eliminate 
(‘burn”/“decrease”) other participants money by giving up/sacrificing their 
own earnings at the rate of one-tenth currency per each unit eliminated. The 
final earnings of the participants were decided on the basis of random dictator 
approach. That is, even though the burning decision of all the four players was 
recorded, only the choice of “D” was implemented. The fifth was the final 
payment stage.18 
                                                 
17 Rs 100 is approximately € 1.30. In four sessions the participants refused to take the 
participation fee.  
18 The design and instructions of the money burning experiment in this thesis is 
inspired and motivated by Zizzo and Oswald’s (2001) study “Are People Willing to 
Pay to Reduce Others Income?” 
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Substantial efforts were made to ensure that the players could not reveal 
their decisions to each other. Locations for the experiment were carefully 
chosen to ensure no disturbance or the least possible disturbance during the 
session. 
Experiment details 
Each session was played with 4 participants. Efforts were made to ensure that 
the four participants chosen for a session were from a similar socio-economic 
background and were not related to each other or were just acquaintances. This 
was necessary, considering the design and intention of the experiment. At the 
start of the experiment, all four participants was asked to choose a number 
from 1-50 and write their choice at the back of the sheet given to them prior to 
the experiment. The player who wrote down the largest number was allotted 
alphabet A and the player who wrote down the smallest number was allotted 
the letter D.  Placard with their respective alphabets were placed in front of 
each participant. Subsequently, the instructions of the experiment were read 
out to them in Hindi.  
The experiment was divided into five stages: 
 
Stage 1 - The task based endowment 
In the first stage, the participants were given a chance to earn their initial 
endowment by doing a simple task. The aim of this stage was to distribute the 
initial endowment on a fair and effort-based approach and to mimic income 
differences in the real world based on the capabilities and hard-work of 
individuals. The experiment assumes that the income inequality (unequal final 
outcome) created due to the capabilities or hard-work of individuals is 
considered fair by others.  
The task design was simple, and un-related to academic aptitude or work 
skills. A stack of 30 coins was placed in-front of each participant (picture #3 in 
Annexure B). The stack included coins of different values, one rupee coins, 
two rupee coins and five rupee coins. The task was to pick out as many two 
rupee coins from their individual stacks in 15 seconds. The participant who 
picked the most coins was considered the winner and was eligible for the 
highest amount of the initial endowment. In case of a tie, the task was repeated 
with a shorter duration of 10 seconds. 
The instructions clearly stated that the first winner was entitled to the 
highest amount – Rs 300, the second to Rs 200, third to Rs 150 and fourth to 
Rs 100.  The participants were also instructed that the game was being played 
with real money and that they were entitled to take this money home and 
therefore, should take the task seriously.  
Since the sessions were held in different settings and locations, efforts 
were made to ensure that all the participants were at the same level of ease and 
convenience to play the game.  
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After the task, the result was announced in front of all the participants. At 
this point, fake plastic currency in the form of poker chips were distributed as 
a substitute for real money. At the same time, participants were instructed that 
the fake currency was being used only for ease of the game and they would get 
real money at end of the experiment. After the distribution of their individual 
earnings, each participant was asked to write their earnings (amount) on a sheet 
given to them under the column “Initial Endowment” (picture #4 in Annexure 
B). In addition, they were also instructed to write down the initial amount of 
other player’s as that would help them make decisions later in the experiment.  
During sessions, if any player was unable to write or required help with the 
instructions, the research assistant or I wrote down the amount for them on 
their sheets.  
At the end of this stage, participants were again reminded that this round 
had given them a chance to earn their money on a fair and effort-based 
approach.  
 
Stage 2 - The betting 
In the second stage participants were given a chance to play a lottery with their 
earnings from the first stage. The aim of this stage was to create an unequal 
wealth distribution. The experiment offered a lottery (1/3 chance of winning) 
and each individual had an equal chance of winning. The underlying aim of this 
stage was to introduce inequalities in the distribution of wealth but on the basis 
of a fair process. The betting outcomes are assumed to be fair based on the 
idea that often individuals attribute their financial or social conditions to their 
luck or destiny.  
Players had to choose how much of their initials earnings to bet (a number 
between 0 and their maximum earnings). They could bet the entire amount, no 
amount or part of their amount in the lottery. The result of the bet was 
decided through a draw of chits. Three chits were placed in front of each 
player and they had to choose one chit. If a chit with number 1 was drawn, the 
player won and retained the original (uninvested) amount and in addition 
doubled the amount of the bet. In case any other number was drawn (2 or 3) 
the bet was lost. Participants were clearly instructed that the bet was not 
compulsory.  
Each participant was then asked to write the amount they wished to bet 
on the sheet under the column – “Lottery (Invest)” (picture #4 in Annexure 
B). Steps were taken to ensure that this was done in anonymity.  
The chit was drawn and the results were conveyed to each player. While 
announcing their results extra effort was made to convey their results in a 
manner that primes the feeling of “being lucky/unlucky”. For example, if a 
participant won the lottery, he/she was congratulated by using phrase like 
“Great! Your luck has worked very well today” and quite the opposite if 
someone lost their bet like “Oh sorry! Seems like your luck is not in your 
favour today” (picture #5 in Annexure B). 
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Stage 3 - The treatment 
In this stage, instead of the fair lottery game, two players were given an 
additional amount of Rs 300 as a “gift”.19 The aim of this stage was to further 
increase wealth inequalities (unequal outcome) induced in the first and second 
stage and simultaneously introduce procedural unfairness in the experiment. 
Furthermore, the idea was that since the players had now experienced the 
effort-based (fair) payout and the fair lottery stage, the unfairness in the 
arbitrary allocation of money at this stage would strike them as particularly 
“unfair”. 
As per the design, in each session, only players A and C received the gift.  
B and D did not receive the gift in any of the sessions.  The treatment in this 
experiment is “not receiving the gift”. Thus, according to the treatment 
defined, players B and D are players in the treatment group.  
However, the participants were unaware of this selection. The instructions 
at this stage of the experiment read that the additional money is granted based 
on some pre-determined criteria and the reasons cannot be disclosed. Thus, in 
each session, the players – A and C have the initial effort based payout, the 
returns from their bets and the additional Rs. 300. The other two players – B 
and D, did not get any gift money but retain their initial effort based payout 
and the returns from their bet.  
The total gain of the four players (up to this stage) was then announced. 
In addition to the announcement, the players were instructed to write this 
amount on their sheets so as to make it visually clear.  
 
Stage 4 - The burning 
In this stage, the four participants were offered an opportunity to decrease 
each other’s money by paying a part of their own money at the rate of one-
tenth currency per each unit eliminated. The aim of this stage was to 
understand and explore the reactions of the participants when faced with 
unequal outcomes which have been reached through fair and unfair 
procedures. 
The instructions further stated that once all the players have made their 
burning decision, a random dictator design will be implemented to determine 
their final earnings. Random dictator design meant that any one participant’s 
burning decision will be chosen and finalised to determine the burning.  
According to the design of the experiment, the random dictator was 
always player “D”. However, this was not known to the participants. The 
subjects were requested to write down their decisions under the column – 
“Eliminate Following Amount of” (picture #4 in Annexure B).  
The participants were again reminded that “there is no right or wrong 
here. You can decrease the money of other in any way you chose or not at all. 
Also remember that the other player will also give his/her recommendation to 
decrease your money”.  
                                                 
19Rs 500 in six sessions. 
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Special attention was made while explaining to them that “the money they 
chose to burn will not be given to them. And in the end, only one player’s 
decision will be randomly selected for the burning/elimination decision”. 
 
Stage 5 - The payment 
The final earnings of each participant were calculated. This included the 
adjusted sum of each participant depending on the decision of the dictator D. 
The final monetary value of each participant was told to them. The participants 
were further asked to remain seated for a short questionnaire. Each participant 
was taken out of the room or to a distant area, individually, for the 
questionnaire and their payments (picture #6 in Annexure B). The participant 
was paid his/her earnings, if any, and the participation fee. The players were 
paid one at a time, and the amounts were given in an envelope and their 
signature was duly taken on the receipt book.  
 
The questionnaire 
After the experiment, the participants answered additional questions to obtain 
socio-demographic characteristics, complementary information on the 
experiment as well the participant’s attitude towards the demonetization policy. 
The questions on the experiment had a similar formulation as the questions 
used by Zizzo and Oswald (2001) in their money burning game. The survey 
questionnaire is attached in Annexure (C). The questionnaire consisted of three 
parts.  
The first part included socio-demographic characteristics of the 
participants: age, employment status, gender, marital status, level of education, 
occupation, family size, and religion.  The possible answer for age, 
employment, education level and family size were in categories.20 
The second part included three questions related to the experiment. These 
questions explored: 
o “Comprehension” of the experiment, that is, whether the participants 
understood the experiment or not. The question was necessary to include, 
since, there is a possibility that a participant made his/her burning decision, 
in the absence of proper understanding of the experiment.  
o “Motivation” of the subjects for making their final burning decisions. The 
question was included to understand the different factors driving their 
decisions. The question also aims to test whether the treatment in our 
                                                 
20 The possible answer category for age: 1[18-24], 2[25-34], 3[35-44], 4[45-54] and 5 
[55 and above]. For education: 1[less than primary], 2[primary], 3[secondary], 
4[college], 5[post graduation] and 6[others]. For occupation: 1[Housewives], 2[Daily 
wage labour], 3[Seasonal Labour], 4[Service-Private], 5[Business], 
6[students/researchers/teachers], 7[contributing family workers], 8[others]. For 
Family Size: 1[two or less], 2[more than two], 3[four or more]. 
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experiment – “unfairness/unfair procedure” was clear to the participants 
or not.  
o  “Motivation of other players” in the group. This question was included to 
understand how participants interpret the behaviours and actions of others. 
The third part included questions on demonetization: 
o Whether the participant favoured demonetization when it was 
implemented and the reason for their support or lack of support.  
o Whether the participant still favours demonetization nine months after its 
implementation and why. 
o Whether they experienced any monetary loss during the policy 
implementation. 
o Whether they experienced any inconvenience by standing in banks and 
ATMs during the policy implementation.  
The questions on individuals’ motivation, others motivation and views on 
demonetization were all open-ended questions. The purpose of including these 
questions was to get an insight on the complete range of possible responses 
from the participants and not limit their responses to certain category or check 
list. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature discussed and the experiment, this thesis aims to test 
three specific hypotheses: 
H1 - Treatment effect and pure self-interest 
 If individuals are driven purely by self-interest, then their treatment status 
(received no gift money/treated unfairly) should have no bearing on their 
burning decision as burning implies a reduction in their own endowment. 
However, if they do burn money it implies that they are concerned not just 
about their own endowment but also their relative endowment and/or the fact 
that they were treated unfairly.  
H2 - Treatment effect and social preferences 
If unfair treatment matters then subjects who are treated unfairly (the 
treatment group) should burn more money than the subjects who receive gift 
money. That is, the burning rate for the two individuals who did not receive a 
gift (B and D, no-gift) should be greater than the burning rate for individuals 
who did receive a gift (A and C, gift). 
H3 - Fairness and procedural unfairness 
Subjects who were treated unfairly should burn a greater amount of the 
endowment of those who received the gift money as compared to subjects that 
did not receive a gift. That is, the two individuals who did not receive a gift (B 
and D) should burn a greater amount of the endowments of A and C rather 
than each other’s, or the amount burnt when comparing no gift-gift should be 
greater than the amount burnt for those in the category no gift-no gift. 
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As a corollary to H3, those who have received a gift, perhaps due to guilt, 
should be less likely to burn the money of those who have not received a gift. 
That is, the group gift-no gift should burn less as compared to those in the 
category no-gift-no-gift. 
H4 - Demonetization acceptance 
A positive correlation between burning (which acts as a proxy for fairness or 
envy) and support for demonetisation.  
The regression specifications to test these hypotheses are discussed in the 
next section.  
3.3 Econometric specification 
In the first instance, the aim is to examine whether the treatment status of an 
individual has a bearing on the burning decision (H1). To estimate the average 
effect of the treatment (not receiving the gift) on burning outcomes, the first 
specification maybe written as,  
 
Burningis= α+ β0 nogiftis + δ Xis+ νs+ εis , 
 
(1) 
 
 where, Burningis ,(a continuous variable) denotes the total amount of 
money burnt by individual i in session s, nogiftis is a variable which indicates 
whether an individual received the gift or not. It is a dummy variable, which 
takes on the value of one if an individual did not receive the gift and zero 
otherwise. Xis is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics of individuals, 
νsis a session fixed effect, and εis is a random error term. Since treatment is 
randomized, the coefficient β0 is expected to provide an unbiased estimate of 
the average effect of the treatment on the burning outcome. If the coefficient 
nogiftis is zero it implies that individuals only care about their endowment and 
not the endowment of others or the manner in which they have been treated 
(H1). If indeed, the coefficient on nogiftis is statistically different from zero then 
the data supports importance of social preference (H2). 
Although the comparison between individuals receiving the gift and not 
receiving the gift identifies the average impact of the treatment on burning, it 
does not capture the fact that burning will also depend on the status of (gift-no 
gift) other participants. To examine these interactions consider a reformulation 
of (1) which may be written as follows:  
 
Burningis=α+β0 nogiftis+β1 otherplayers_nogiftis+β2 (nogift* otherplayers_nogift) is 
  + Xisδ + νs+ εis,  
 
(2) 
 
where, otherplayers_nogiftis  indicates whether the other player in a session 
has received a gift or not as compared to the individual with nogiftis. It is a 
dummy variable and takes on the value of one the individual has not received 
the gift and zero otherwise.  
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The data set is constructed such that each individual (A for instance) is 
faced with a chance to burn money of remaining three players (B, C and D) in 
a session. Thus, in equation (2), the variable nogiftis indicates whether A receives 
a gift or not in a particular session and the variable otherplayers_nogiftis indicates 
the treatment of B, C and D (as compared to A). Detailed explanation of the 
data structure is attached in the Annexure (D) and explains both variables 
nogiftis and otherplayersis in an elaborate and easy-to-read manner.  
The linear combination of the coefficients estimated using (2) allows a test 
of H3. The interactions are explained in Table (1) below.  
Table 1 
Description of the interactions for money burning outcome 
Interaction Explanation Alternate 
Explanation 
Estimated 
coefficient (2) 
Gift - Gift Average burnings when a 
player has received the gift and 
the other player has also 
received the gift. 
Average burnings 
of A and C  
(by each other) 
α 
Gift - No Gift Average burnings when a 
player has received the gift and 
the other player has not 
received the gift 
Average burnings 
of B and D by A 
and C. 
α + β1 
No Gift - Gift  Average burnings when a 
player has not received the gift 
and the other player has 
received the gift 
Average burnings 
of A and C by B 
and D. 
α + β0 
No Gift - No Gift  Average burnings when a 
player has not received the gift 
and the other player has also 
not received the gift. 
Average burnings 
of B and D  
(by each other).  
 
α + β0  +β1  +β2 
 
 
Specifically, if H3 holds then no gift-gift should be greater than no gift-no gift 
or α + β0 should be greater than α + β0 +β1 +β2. If the corollary to H3 holds 
then α + β1 should be less than α + β0 +β1 +β2.Equations 1 and 2 are estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). In addition to providing estimates of 
burning, we also provide estimates for the probability of burning where 
burning is treated as binary outcome. Second, we also estimate a specification 
where the dependent variable is the money burning rate, that is, the amount of 
money that an individual burns of the total money which may be burnt.  
Finally, since one of the objectives of this study is also to examine whether 
there is any explicit link between the desire to inflict pain on others by burning 
their money and acceptance of demonetisation in India. We try to examine this 
by combining the data from experiment and the data from the questionnaire 
collected during the research. A linear probability model is estimated where 
support for demonetization is modelled as: 
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Demosupporti= burningi+ nogifti+ Xiδ + εi, (3) 
 
where, Demosupporti takes a value 1 if an individual supports 
demonetisation policy. Burningiis a continuous variable and in this model is 
used as a proxy for unobserved social preferences in real life (concern for 
fairness or envy) and the support for demonetization policy is expected to be 
affected by this social preference.  
Before presenting the results of the experiment, the next chapter provides 
information regarding the data, research sites and provides an overview of the 
dataset gathered during the research.  
4 Data and descriptive analysis 
The first section of the chapter describes the data sample and location. The 
second section presents the socio-economic characteristics of the participants 
along with the composition of data sample by treatment and control. The last 
section provides an overall view of the participants on demonetization policy.  
4.1 Data sample and data location 
The sample was collected during the months of July-August, 2017. The sample 
was broadly divided into five socio-economic groups – daily wage labourers 
(22.78 percent), farmers (20 percent), housewives (17.78 percent), private 
services (23.33 percent) and business (16.11 percent).21 Daily wage labourers 
include construction workers, carpenters, security guards, housekeepers, auto-
drivers. Housewives include full-time home-makers. In private services, the 
participants include bankers, chartered accountants, financial analysts and 
employees of private companies. The business group includes shopkeepers and 
small and medium business holders.22  Table (A) in the Annexure (E) displays 
the main features of data collection. 
Research site  
The experiment was conducted in both urban and rural areas with an aim to 
produce a more diverse sample as compared to the standard sample of 
graduate school students.  
The rural sample with 26 sessions (104 subjects) was collected from nine 
villages in Bijnor district in the state of Uttar Pradesh namely, Shahpur Jamal, 
Biharipur, Hasanpur, Afzalgarh, Nadehi, KasampurGarhi, Barkatpur, 
Macchmar, SarkaraKhedi. The area was chosen due to practical reasons as it 
                                                 
21 This group includes seasonal labourer also (5.5 percent)  
22 While designing the experiment, the intention was to include “researchers” as one of 
the groups in the experiment. However, due to difficulty in finding and finalizing at 
least 20-24 individual researchers in New Delhi, the group was substituted with 
“business/shopkeepers”. 
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enabled easier access to potential participants. The local language spoken in the 
entire district is Hindi.  Efforts were taken to conduct the experiments in 
locations with minimum disturbance and noise. An overview of the experiment 
site in rural areas is presented in Table (B) in Annexure (E).  
For the urban sample, the region selected was the capital city of New 
Delhi, and neighbouring cities of Noida & Gurugram. Nineteen sessions (76 
subjects) were conducted in these three cities. The sessions were conducted in 
various neighbourhoods of the New Delhi including North Delhi, North West 
Delhi, Central Delhi, East Delhi and South West Delhi. Noida is located in the 
Gautam Buddh Nagar district of Uttar Pradesh state, and shares its border 
with the capital New Delhi. It is about 25 kilometres southeast of New Delhi.  
It is also a part of National Capital Region of India. Gurugram (also called 
Gurgaon) is a highly urbanized city in the Indian state of Haryana and is about 
32 kilometres southwest of New Delhi. It is also a part of National Capital 
Region of India. Location details of the experiment for urban data are 
presented in Table (C) in Annexure (E). 
4.2 Socio-economic characteristics of the participants 
Overall, the sample consists of 137 men (76.11 percent) and 43 females (23.89 
percent). The ratio of males was higher in the sample mainly because of the 
groups chosen. Except for housewives and private services, in other groups, it 
was only possible to conduct the experiment with males. The daily wage  
Figure 1 
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Note: The education level was reported by the categories 1[less than primary],  
2[primary], 3[secondary], 4[college], 5[post-graduation], 6[others] 
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labourer group does have female workers but during the data collection most 
of them did not agree to participate. 89 percent of the participants in the 
sample fall in the age bracket 25-54. Majority of the participants (73 percent) 
had secondary and higher level education. The participants in the urban 
locations had higher education than participants in the rural location (see 
Figure (#1). A majority of the participants (81 percent) reported Hinduism as 
their religion. The remaining sample reported Muslim and Sikhism as their 
religion mainly. 
Table 2 
Demographic statistics of the sample and Verification of Randomization 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample & Verification of Randomization
Treatment (n=90) Control (n=90) t-test
Variable Total observations Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p value 
Gender (M=1, F=0) 180 0.76 0.43 0.77 0.43  0.76 0.43 0.862
Ability to read/write (Y=1,N=0) 180 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.23  0.92 0.27 0.553
Age
Between 18-24 180 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29  0.13 0.34 0.346
Between 25-34 180 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.46  0.29 0.46 1.000
Between 35-44 180 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.48  0.32 0.47 0.753
Between 45-54 180 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37  0.14 0.35 0.683
Above 55 180 0.1 0.3 0.11 0.32  0.11 0.32 1.000
Education
No education 180 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34  0.16 0.36 0.674
Primary 180 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32  0.14 0.35 0.506
Secondary 180 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46  0.26 0.44 0.618
College 180 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.47  0.3 0.47 0.874
Post-Graduation 180 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.36  0.11 0.32 0.383
Technical/Vocational 180 0.01 0.07 0 0  0.01 0.11 0.319
Occupation
Housewives 180 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37  0.18 0.38 0.845
Daily Wage Labourer 180 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38  0.18 0.38 1.000
Seasonal Labourer 180 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44  0.26 0.44 0.866
Service-Private 180 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23  0.04 0.21 0.734
Business 180 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35  0.14 0.35 1.000
Others 180 0.19 0.4 0.19 0.39  0.2 0.4 0.852
Marital Status
Single 180 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38  0.1 0.32 0.205
Married 180 0.85 0.36 0.82 0.38  0.88 0.33 0.299
Widowed 180 0.01 0.07 0 0  0.01 0.11 0.319
Family Size
Less than two 180 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29  0.04 0.21 0.234
Two to Four 180 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48  0.39 0.49 0.541
Four or more 180 0.56 0.5 0.56 0.5  0.56 0.5 1.000
Religion
Hindu 180 0.81 0.39 0.84 0.36  0.78 0.42 0.256
Muslim 180 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31  0.11 0.33 0.810
Christian 180 0 0 0 0  0 0 0.000
Sikhism 180 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18  0.07 0.25 0.308
Other Religions 180 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15  0.04 0.2 0.409
Employment Status
Employed 180 0.49 0.5 0.52 0.5  0.49 0.5 0.882
Self-Employed 180 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.43  0.23 0.43 1.000
Part-time Employed 180 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21  0.04 0.21 1.000
Retired 180 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.1  0.02 0.15 0.563
Unemployed 180 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41  0.21 0.41 1.000
Comprehesion 180 0.86 0.35  0.89 0.32  0.83 0.37 0.284
Location (U=1,R=0) 180 0.42 0.5  0.42 0.5  0.42 0.5 1.000
Total Sample
 
Source: estimation based on data gathered by author 
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Table (2) displays the demographic statistics of the sample and also 
compares the characteristics of the sample in treatment (B and D) with those 
in the control group (A and C). In general, the experimental approach appears 
to have created groups that are comparable in terms of characteristics.  
Descriptive statistics by treatment confirm that the two groups – that is, 
those who receive the gift and those who don’t are similar in terms of their 
socio-economic characteristics. The last column in Table (2) presents p-values 
of difference-in-means between the two groups. Equality of means cannot be 
rejected at the 5 percent level for any of the characteristics. 
4.3 Views and statistics on demonetization 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis was partly motivated by the 
widespread support for demonetisation. In addition to examining social 
preferences, I used my research to see first-hand how demonetisation affected 
people and an explanation for their support (if any). In order to do that, I 
designed some questions regarding the policy and its implication. This section 
presents the findings from the questionnaire.  
72 per cent of the 180 participants stated that they supported the 
demonetization policy when it was implemented. Within the different groups, 
the maximum support was shown by daily-wage labour group (80 percent) and 
the private service employees (81 percent).  Majority of the housewives in the 
rural sample had no opinion on the policy. Two reasons were noticed for this 
Figure 2 
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Note: The support for demonetization was reported by the categories 1[Yes], 2[No], 3[No opinion] 
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during the survey. First, unawareness about the policy and second, no affect 
from the policy due to very less or no personal income. Figure#2 shows the 
mean level of support across groups and location. 
Of the participants who favoured the policy, 45 percent reported that 
Black Money is a big issue in India and the policy will tackle this problem. 
Another 9 percent stated that the hardship is temporary and the policy was 
needed to tackle growing corruption and extreme inequality.  A participant 
expressed his view by quoting-“This is a revolutionary move by the Prime Minister. 
Irrespective of the short term public inconvenience, it will have long term implications for the 
best interest of the nation”. Some subjects supported it for the good of the nation.  
Of 14 percent non-supporters, some reasoned that India is a cash-based 
economy and therefore the policy is not likely to work. The other common 
view was that since black wealth is saved mostly in gold, foreign accounts and 
real-estate properties, targeting only “cash” may not provide the desired 
results.  
Figure 3 
Reasons for demonetization support 
Housewives DWL Seasonal labourer
Service-Private Business Farmer
Black Money Cash Economy
Corruption Extreme Inequality
Nation's betterment No opinion
Others
Source: data gathered by the author
Across Different Groups 
Reasons for Demonetization Support 
 
 
Across all the groups, main reason to support the policy was the concern 
of Black Money in the country (Figure#3). The housewives, more specifically 
in the rural areas, either were not aware of the policy or did not have an 
opinion on it. At the same time, survey with other housewives also revealed the 
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hardship faced owing to the policy.23 One of the participants, when asked 
about her view on the policy, expressed herself by stating ““I lost all my savings 
because of this policy. I do not have a bank account and am not educated enough to use 
banks and ATMs. I have to give all my life savings to my husband. We had a fight since I 
secretly kept this money for my bad times”.   
Interestingly, when asked, if they still favoured demonetization, nine 
months after its implementation, the support rate dropped to almost 37 
percent (from 72 percent) majorly due to the inconvenience caused from its 
poor implementation and no visible result in those nine months. 34 percent 
stated that they faced inconvenience of standing in the banks and ATMs 
queues. A farmer from one of the villages expressed -“There are three ATMs in 
this region. Only one of them was working that time. It was very cold in November but we 
use to go and stand in the lines all night. We use to carry our blanket and food with us. It 
was not possible to stand in the ATM lines during the day due to our work”.  
The next chapter presents and discuss the results.  
5 Results 
This chapter explains the experiment results and present the findings of the 
regression. The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section presents an 
overview of the initial endowment and betting stage statistics. The second 
sections present the burning results and test the stated research hypotheses.  
5.1 Initial endowment and betting statistics 
This section presents the finding of the task and betting stage in the 
experiment.  
On an average, the players earned Rs 187.50 in the first round and 
invested Rs 86 in the lottery round. Players, on an average invested around 
47.62 % of their initial endowment in the lottery24. Table (3) displays the 
experimental results of the sample and also compares the characteristics it in 
treatment (B and D) with those in the control group (A and C). 
                                                 
23 In India, it is common for housewives to keep some undisclosed wealth from their 
husband for urgent or bad circumstances. This is due to low literacy and also not been 
to access the banking facilities. In rural areas specifically, the housewives do not have 
separate bank accounts. When demonetization was implemented in India, a lot of 
women had to disclose their wealth resulting in monetary losses and also domestic 
violence.  
24 Investment rate is the percentage of amount invested in the lottery out of the initial 
endowment. 
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Table 3 
Experiment statistics 
t-test
 Characteristics Total number of observation Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p value
Initial eanings 180 187.5 74.16 201.11 73.05 173.89 73.14 0.01
Bet - Lottery 180 86 56.89 83.44 58.13 88.56 55.82 0.548
Investment Rate 180 47.62 27.83 42.82 25.53 52.41 29.31 0.0204
Earnings - Post treatment 180 317.33 191.28 174.00 123.78 460.67 129.28 0.00
Final Payment 180 246.34 166.92 149.24 118.87 343.44 151.12 0.00
Experiment Results 
(Total 180 participants in 45 sessions)
Full Sample Treatment (n=90) Control (n=90)
Treatment : Receiving No Gift in the experiment
                     Source: data gathered by the author 
 
The treatment group is observed to have done better in the task of stage 
one than the control group. The results are mostly influenced by the high 
endowment of player D as compared to other players. There is no statistically 
significant difference noticed in the average betting of the treatment and 
control group (p=0.548).  The post treatment earnings of the control group is 
significantly more than the treatment group because of the additional gift 
money given to the control group.  
5.2 Burning results 
Average effect of not receiving a gift on burning 
This section presents regression results and tests the four hypotheses.  
Table (4) presents OLS regression results of equation (1). Column (1) estimates 
the effect of treatment status of an individual on burning. Column (2) controls 
for session effects and Column (3) presents the extended specification 
including socio-demographic controls and session effects. 
Table 4 
The average effect of not receiving a gift on burning 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Gift 47.167*** 47.167*** 44.042*** 0.159** 0.178*** 10.474*** 9.921***
(8.427)   (8.427)   (9.861)   (0.054)   (0.057)   (2.118)   (2.352)   
Constant 24.41*** 44.750*** 41.998   -0.496*** 0.104   -9.281*** 9.552   
(4.19) (4.214)   (124.311)   (0.027)   (0.703)   (1.059)   (28.739)   
Number of Observation 540 540  540 540  540 540  540
R squared 0.0693 0.2187 0.2911 0.2522 0.3345 0.1975 0.288
Session effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-economic Controls No No Yes No Yes No Yes
      Note :   This table reports the effect of treatment on the burning outcome. Column(2) includes socio-economic characteristics: gender (1/0), literacy(1/0), 
dummies for education level, employment, occupation, marital status, familysize and religion. Standard errors are presented in brackets and are clustered 
 by sessions.  */**/*** p<0.1/0.05/0.01, respectively 
Dependent Variable:  Burning Rate (%)Dependent Variable:  Burning (Binary)
The Average Effect of Not Receiving Gift on the Burning 
Dependent Variable:  Burning (continous)
 
35 
 
The positive effect of no gift on burning in column (1) indicates that 
players who are unfairly treated burn Rs 47 more than the players who have 
received gift money. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, (p=0.000). The inclusion of socio-demographic characteristics and 
session effects does not alter the conclusion that being treated unfairly leads to 
greater money burning.  
Columns (4) and (5) present estimates for the probability of burning 
where burning is a binary variable and takes on the value of one if burning is 
greater than zero. With and without socio-economic controls, the coefficient 
associated with burning is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The 
positive sign indicates that the probability of burning a non-zero amount 
increases by 15 to 18 percentage points when an individual is treated unfairly.  
Columns (6) and (7) presents estimates of the effect of not receiving gift  
money on the share of money burnt – that is, the amount of money burnt as a 
share of the individual’s pre-burning stage endowment. Regardless of the 
specification, the estimates show that disadvantaged individuals burn about 10 
percent more than those who were treated fairly.25 
The positive and statistically significant effect of not receiving a gift on the 
absolute amount of the money burnt, the probability of burning and the share 
of money burnt all indicate that hypothesis H1 is not supported. That is, the 
result implies that individuals care not only about their endowment but also the 
manner in which they have been treated and their relative payoff. 
But do all individuals exhibit social preferences? In other words, can we 
completely reject the self-interest theory? Based on our findings, the answer is 
“no”. In our sample of 540 total burning decisions, burning was observed in 36 
percent of the cases, while in the remainder, players chose to burn nothing.26 In 
terms of number of players, of 180 players, 54 percent of 97 players burnt 
money, at a cost to themselves.  As shown in the table below, player D and B, 
who were treated unfairly burnt more money than others and was willing to 
sacrifice their resources to do so. Shown in Column (3 and 4) below, on an 
average, player D engaged in the maximum burning with Rs 86.55 followed by 
player B with Rs 56.59. And to do so, the players in treatment group (B and D) 
were willing to pay Rs 21.13 and Rs 25.94, respectively which is greater than 
the resources sacrificed by the control group players.27 
                                                 
25 The complete details of Column (2-7) are attached in Annexure E (Table A and B) 
26 Working sample in this paper is 45 sessions with 180 participants. Each participant 
was allowed to take three burning decision. A participant could not burn his/her own 
money. In a total of 45 sessions, total numbers of burning decisions made are 180*3 = 
540 decisions. 
27 Of 540 observations, in 465 observations participants displayed complete 
understanding of the experiment and in 75 observations the participants’ displayed no 
or partial understanding of the experiment. It is possible that some subjects chose to 
burn out of misunderstanding of the experiment. We replicated the results using the 
“comprehension” variable– that is whether participants understood the experiment or 
not. There was not much difference observed. In 66.67 percent of the cases, players 
urn nothing with overall mean burning of Rs. 46.08 (std. Dev. 89.96) and median zero. 
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Table 5 
Individual results of each player in three stages 
Number of Observations Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Total Sample 180 187.5 74.16 86 56.89 47.99 68.04 14.45 20.44
Player
A 45 163.33 70.22 84.55 54.18 32.11 50.29 9.63 14.97
B 45 183.33 73.08 85.88 59.24 56.59 70.97 16.97 21.13
C 45 184.44 75.24 92.55 57.74 16.7 28.74 5.23 9.06
D 45 218.89 69.32 81 57.56 86.55 87.1 25.97 25.94
Cost
(4)
Initial Endowment Betting Burning 
(1) (2) (3)
 
 
 
These results are comparable with other literature on social preferences. 
For instance, in Zizzo and Oswald’s (2001) money burning experiment, 62.5 
percent of subjects chose to burn others money and in their later study Zizzo 
(2003), 50 percent of the subjects engaged in burning money. In Kebede and 
Zizzo’s (2014) field experiment and Abbink and Sadrieh (2008) joy-for-
destruction experiment, 44 and 40 percent of the players chose to burn. 
Thus, the results in this paper offer balanced support for both, self-
interest behaviour as well for social preferences. Based on the finding so far, 
we conclude that the traditional self-interest theory cannot be completely ruled 
out while at the same time social preferences also influence the decision of 
individuals.  
Interactions between players and burning 
Table (6) presents results of equation (2). 
Table 6 
Average Effect of Interactions between players on burning 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Gift [1/0] 46.361** 46.361** 43.237** 0.083 0.102   10.364** 9.811** 
(13.392)   (13.978)   (15.287)   (0.073)   (0.077)   (3.167)   (3.528)   
Other player - No Gift [1/0] -38.639*** -38.639*** -38.639*** -0.261*** -0.261*** -5.769*  -5.769*  
(8.055)   (8.408)   (8.658)   (0.048)   (0.05)   (2.382)   (2.453)   
No Gift # Other player - No Gift -36.222*  -36.222*  -36.222*  -0.033 -0.033   -5.440 -5.440
(14.513)   (15.149)   (15.599)   (0.04) (0.084)   (4.512)   (4.647)   
Constant 50.167*** 70.51*** 67.757   0.455*** 0.278 -19.542*** 13.398   
(8.345)   (7.434) (126.548)   (0.421)   (0.711) (1.059)   (29.162)   
N 540 540 540 540 540 540 540
R Squared 0.1676 0.3169 0.3893 0.3268 0.4091 0.2317 0.3230
Session effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-economic Controls No No Yes No Yes No Yes
      Note :   This table reports the effect of treatment on the burning outcome. Column(3, 5 and 7) includes socio-economic characteristics: gender (1/0), literacy(1/0), dummies for education 
level, employment, occupation, marital status, familysize and religion. Standard errors are presented in brackets and are clustered  by sessions.  */**/*** p<0.1/0.05/0.01, respectively 
The Average Effect of Interactions between the Players on the Burning 
Dependent Variable:  Burning (continous) Dependent Variable:  Burning (binary) Dependent Variable:  Burning Rate (%)
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Column (1) in Table (6) presents estimates of equation 2 without 
controlling for session fixed effects or socio-economic indicators. Column (2) 
controls for session fixed effects. Column (3) is the extended specification 
including socio-demographic controls and session fixed effects. Column (4 and 
5) use burning as a binary outcome and Column (6 and 7) defines the 
dependent variable as burning rate.28  
Similar to the findings in Table 5, those who do not receive a gift burn Rs. 
46 more than those who do receive a gift and their burning rate is about 10 
percentage points higher than gift recipients. The result confirms H2 and 
implies that irrespective of the treatment status of other player, if an individual 
has been treated unfairly, burning will be higher.  
Based on the coefficients in columns (1-3) we now explore the different 
interactions in Table (7) below:  
Table 7 
Average Burning in Different Interactions 
Interactions Coefficient in equation 2 Mean p value Mean p value Mean p value
(1) (2) (3)
Gift-Gift α 50.167 0.00 70.519 0.000 67.75 0.595
(7.434) (7.434) (126.58)
No Gift-Gift α + β 0 96.527 0.00 116.87 0.000 110.99 0.389
(8.278) (8.278) (127.59)
Gift-No Gift α + β 1 11.527 0.03 31.87 0.000 29.11 0.815
(4.762) (4.761) (123.68)
No Gift-No Gift α + β 0  +  β 1  + β 2 21.667 0.00 42.009 0.000 36.132 0.773
(4.788) (5.345) (124.63)
Session Effects No Yes Yes
Socio-economic characteristics No No Yes
The Average Burnings in Different Interactions 
Note : These linear combinations of the coefficients from equation 2 are estimated using "Lincom" command in Stata.  
 
The interactions in all three specification shows similar pattern. The point 
estimates do not vary much with the inclusion of session and socio-economic 
controls. However, in Column (3) we observe large standard error associated 
with the estimates. This is likely due to the large number of control (81) 
                                                 
28 The complete details of Column (2-7) can be seen in Annexure E (Table C and D).  
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variables in the specification. For this reason, the discussion below is based on 
the results in Column (2) which only controls for session effects but no other 
socio-economic indicators.  
The point estimate for No Gift-Gift –Rs. 116.87 is substantially greater 
than for No Gift-No Gift (Rs.42). The difference is large and statistically 
significant. Clearly, individuals who did not receive a gift (B and D) choose to 
burn a greater amount of the endowments of A and C rather of each other’s. 
The result supports H3 and the relevant literature which states that procedural 
fairness matters along with relative payoffs or outcomes (Hoffman and Spitzer, 
1985).  
We further used the questionnaire data to strengthen our hypotheses and 
enrich the findings. The responses obtained support the previous finding of 
existence of both self-interest behaviour and social preferences. Post 
experiment, the participants was asked a simple question as to what motivated 
their burning decision.  The study finds that of the 97 players, who chose to 
burn some amount, at-least 62 players stated that their action was motivated by 
a desire for equal share and unfairness concerns (22 “Equal share”, 35 – 
“Unfairness”, 5 –“Others got more money”). And of 83 players who did not 
burn any amount, 59 players went by the rule of self-interest stating they had 
“No Reason” (43) or “No Personal Gain” (16) in burning others money. 
Amongst individuals who exhibited social preferences, concern for 
fairness dominated their behaviour. Fairness includes both, an equal and fair 
distribution and the fair process through which the distribution is achieved. We 
also found some evidence of burning from desire to have equal outcomes. 
However, of 90 players in the treatment group who chose to burn others 
money, only 16 players (17.7 percent) reduced Rs 300 or more amount of the 
participants in control group. If subjects were perturbed by equality concerns, 
they would have burnt the additional Rs 300 completely. Complete egalitarian 
behaviour was not observed in most burning decisions. One possible 
explanation of such behaviour can be the cost involved with the burning. In 
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) they considered price elasticity for burning. Up to 
the marginal price of 0.1 the price elasticity was zero and the burning rate went 
down when the price was increased to 0.25. It is possible that if the experiment 
is repeated with less cost than 0.10 the participants display more burnings.  
The study found interesting results in other interactions as well. The 
estimate in the case of Gift- No gift (29.11) is less than in the case of the Gift-
Gift (67.75) interactions. A possible explanation could perhaps be guilt and 
discomfort. In the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the 
loss from disadvantageous inequity (envy) is assumed to be stronger than the 
loss from advantageous inequity (guilt/discomfort). The results are consistent 
with this assumption and show that those who receive a gift burn a greater 
amount of other gift receivers (envy) as compared to those who do not receive 
a gift, perhaps due to a feeling of guilt.  
Overall, there is substantial variation in human behaviour. There is 
support for self-interest behaviour and at the same time evidence for equality, 
fairness and perhaps guilt. The paper shows that social preferences or fairness 
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is driven not only by relative distribution/outcome but also the manner in 
which the outcome is obtained. 
To conclude this section, the estimates show that the standard neoclassical 
model may not be completely rejected. Rather, the empirical evidence and 
theoretical models of social preferences may be used to modify the standard 
utility model and bringing it closer to reality. 
Demonetization and burning 
The last objective of the study was to examine any link between social 
preferences and support for demonetisation. The result of equation (3) is 
presented in the next Table (8).  
Table 8 
Correlation between Demonetization Support and Burning 
Explanatory Variable
Burning -0.0001784 -0.0001784
(0.0002475)   (0.0002414)   
No Gift -0.0701171 -.0602716
(0.110)   (.1094224)
0.525   
Constant 1.454*** 1.9369***
(0.076)   (.5886)
Socio-economic characteristics No Yes
N 180 180
R Squared 0.0054 0.3421
 Standard errors are presented in brackets.  */**/*** p<0.1/0.05/0.01, respectively 
Dependent: Demonetization Support (Binary)
      Note :   Column(2) includes socio-economic characteristics: gender(1/0), literacy(1/0), dummies for 
education level, employment, occupation, marital status, familysize and religion.
Correlation between Demonetization Support and Burning 
 
 
The negative and statistical insignificant coefficient associated with 
demonetisation support indicates that there is no statistical link between the 
support for the policy and burning as a proxy for social preferences. The data 
does not support H4. However, given the high support of 72 percent for the 
policy and burning by only 54 percent of the participant the results are not 
contrary to the expectations.  
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6 Conclusion 
Inspired by demonetization in India and its widespread acceptance, this 
research paper studied the role of social preferences and fairness in influencing 
an individual’s behaviour and economic decisions. More specifically, the 
research paper examined if preference for fair and equal outcome (monetary) 
can affect subjects’ behaviour and result in subject’s willingness to reduce 
others income at a personal cost. To examine this behaviour, the study 
designed a money burning experiment which allowed the participants to earn 
money by fair task and by means of unfair assigned gift. The participants had a 
possibility to reduce other players’ money by sacrificing a part of their own 
money.   
The results of the study found a substantial variation in human behaviour. 
Almost half the sample played the game by rule of self-interest engaging in no 
burning at all. On the other hand, remaining 54 percent of participants chose 
to reduce others money and were willing to cost their own resources (money) 
to do so. Amongst individuals who exhibited social preferences by engaging in 
burning, the fairness concern dominated their decision. The study also found 
that fairness is driven not only by relative distribution/outcome but also the 
manner in which the outcome is obtained. In addition to the fairness 
preference, the study also found some support for equity aversion and perhaps 
guilt. The findings in this paper are comparable with the published literature in 
the field.  
However, the study also acknowledges that the burning behaviour could 
have been affected by other factors as well. First being, the experimenter 
demand effect which means that the subjects burn because of they feel the 
researcher/experimenter expects them to do so. In my research, I tried to 
minimize this effect by reading out the instructions very clearly and reminding 
the participants of burning being a choice (not compulsion) just before they 
took their final decision to burn or not burn.   
Another concern observed goes in line with the discussion by Levitt and 
List (2007) on generalizability of experiments to real world behaviour. It is 
possible that some subjects did not show the true response from experience of 
being scrutinized and observed. During the field work, I encountered few 
situations when people questioned my identity as an academic researcher and 
suspected me of being a member from some political party, especially after the 
questions on demonetization was asked. It is possible that the responses were 
made from fear of being held as anti-national or anti-social. I think it is 
important to account for such biases in experimental studies.  
Lastly, this thesis also attempts to find a link between burning behaviour 
(as a proxy of social preferences) and acceptance of demonetization in India. 
Empirically, the data does not support such link. Considering the high support 
of 72 percent for the policy and burning by only 54 percent of the participant 
we do not find the result surprising.  
Regardless, the complementary data do suggest that policy was supported 
even by those who suffered from it. The popular belief being that it will purge 
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black money, punish the rich and corrupt and will work for nations’ 
betterment. The reasons stated in support of the policy somewhere reflects the 
dissatisfaction among general public against extreme inequality in the country 
and more specifically against the individuals hoarding unaccounted black 
wealth. Having studied how social preferences can motivate a rational 
economic agent to make irrational decisions, the massive support for 
demonetization finds one possible explanation. Of course the support reason 
can vary among people but for some it was the desire to punish corrupts which 
led them to believe in a policy even with no economic upside for them.  
The divergence between the demonetization significance and people’s 
reaction can be attributed to the Prime Minister and his team in successfully 
exploiting human emotions and using it in their favour, intentionally or 
unwittingly. By portraying its design and motive to punish anti-social elements, 
presumably those with unfairly acquired black wealth, the government officials 
were able to build a consensus around the soundness of the policy. Applying 
insights from experimental psychology and behavioural economics to the realm 
of public policy, the government was indeed able to gain a popular support for 
a policy whose economic significance has been critically questioned.  
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Appendices 
Annexure (A): Instructions of the experiment 
 
Welcome and thank you very much for coming and volunteering to participate. 
The purpose of the experiment is to explore and understand some aspects of 
human behaviour and how we make decisions. All the information gathered 
here will be used only for academic research purposes. 29  
Please note that the game is about YOUR decision. There are no right or 
wrong decisions. You should decide on your own/independently and thus, I 
request you not to talk with each other during the experiment.  
The game is played for real money and you will receive the money that 
you have at the end of the game. Thus, please take each stage of the game 
seriously. 
Before starting the experiment, I request you to choose any number from 
1-50 and write down your choice at the back, that is, on the blank side of the 
slips given to you. Based on your selection you will be allotted an alphabet - (A, 
B, C or D).  
The game has three stages.  
In the first stage, you will get a chance to earn an initial endowment. This 
endowment will be allocated on the basis of your effort and performance. It is 
a simple task.  You have a stack of 30 coins in front of you. The stack includes 
coins of three different values; one, two and five. You have to pick only TWO 
rupee coins from it. The one who picks the maximum number of Rupee two 
coins from the stack kept in-front of you in 15 seconds will be considered the 
winner and will receive the highest amount. In case of a tie, we will repeat the 
game, with 10 seconds. The first position will win you Rs 300, second Rs 200, 
third Rs 150 and the last, Rs 100. You will start picking the coins, when I say 
“Start” and stop when announced “Times over”. In case of a tie, you will be 
asked to play the game again in 10 seconds. 
(Task was done and the results were announced. Fake currency was 
distributed at this stage.)  
We again remind you, that in this stage, we gave you a chance to earn the 
money based on your effort and performance.  
Please write the amount received on the sheet given to you under the 
column, “Initial Endowment”. This will help you remember your initial 
earnings as well as help in the later stages of the experiment. You must also 
write the amount earned by other players in this round in-front of their allotted 
alphabet.  
                                                 
29 In the field, the word “game” was used instead of experiment. 
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After this stage, you will be asked to play a lottery. You will decide how 
much money you want to use to buy a lottery – you can use all your money, a 
part of it or no money at all. You can only bet from the amount you have 
received in the first task. You are not allowed to bet your personal money.  
The results of the lottery will be made through draw of chits from the 
bowl. You will pick chits on your behalf. If 1 is drawn, you win and if 2 or 3 
are drawn you lose. This means, every one of you, have a one-third probability 
of winning the lottery. If you win, the amount you invested in the lottery 
doubles.  
For example, you started with Rs 200 and if you use Rs 50 to invest in the 
lottery and win then your earnings will be 50*2 = 100 + 150 = 250. If you lose, 
you are only left with Rs 150 after the round.  
Another example, you start with say Rs 100 and decide not to invest at all 
in the lottery. So, after the first round your final earnings will remain Rs 100.  
For more clarification, say you start with Rs 300 and decide to invest the 
entire amount. If 1 is drawn and you win, the final earnings will be 300*2 = 
600. If you lose, you are left with no money after this round.  
It is up to you if and what amount you want to invest. You can choose not 
to invest in the lottery as well or invest the entire amount as well.  
Now we play the first lottery round. Please note that this is played for real 
money. Now, please write the amount you wish to invest or not invest on the 
paper given to you (under the Lottery/Invest column). The amount you chose 
to invest should remain confidential right now, thus we request you to write 
your decision and do not speak it out loud.  
Please note that it is not compulsory to invest in the lottery. It is entirely 
your decision to invest or not. 
(Results were drawn. The winners received additional fake currency of the 
additional amount. Similarly, the bet amount was taken back from the losers. 
The results were announced of the lottery.  
This ends the second stage. We again remind you that in the first stage we 
gave you a chance to earn money based on your effort and in this round, based 
on your luck.  
The third stage - Treatment: Now, the third stage, in which Player A and 
C, have been chosen for additional money of Rs 300 
We cannot disclose the reason for selecting only these two players.  
Thus after this stage, the final earnings so far of each player in the groups 
are announced. We again, request you to write your final earnings and also the 
earnings of other players, in the total gains column.  
This starts the fourth stage of our experiment. So far, we were in charge of 
the experiment and making you do various things. Now, we will give you a 
chance to make some decisions.  You will be asked to tell us by how much you 
would like to decrease the money of other person, if given a chance. The 
money of the other player includes the initial money, any lottery win and the 
gift money.  Please note that to decrease the money of another by say Rs 10, 
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you have to pay Rs 1 of your own (10% fixed amount). Basically, you pay one-
tenth of the money you want to decrease of the other player.   
For example, assume total gains of player A is Rs 400, B – Rs 200, C – 0 
and D – Rs 700. Please note that this is just an example. Now say, player B has 
to decide whether she/he wishes to eliminate others money or not. She/he 
decides to eliminate or decrease Rs 100 from A’s earnings and Rs 200 for D’s 
earning, so in order to do that, player B will have to pay one-tenth of the total, 
that is, one-tenth of 300 (100+200) which is Rs 30 from his/her own earnings.  
Please tell us if the process is not clear. We will give you more examples for the 
same.  
Again, note that there is no right or wrong here. You can decrease the 
money of other in any way you chose or not at all. Also, remember that the 
other player will too give his/her recommendation to decrease your money. In 
the end, we will randomly choose one player and his/her decision of 
decreasing the money and will implement that in the experiment. Thus, for 
example, you chose not to burn others money but in the random pick, we 
select the player who decreased your money, then your earnings will be 
reduced and vice-versa. 
Also most importantly, please note that the money which you decide to 
eliminate will not be given to you.  
The experiment will end and your final earnings will be counted according 
to that player’s decision. We ensure you that the decision you make, will not be 
known to the others. Any decision you make, will be strictly confidential. And 
in-order to ensure that, we will take you, individually, at some distance, where 
the other participants cannot see you and you can tell us your final decision 
without any hesitation. 
(The burning instructions were repeated and explained one more time to 
all the participants, individually, before they made their final decision.) 
Thank you again for volunteering in this experiment.  Your time and 
participation is very much appreciated. We request your patience for another 5-
10 for us to do the final calculations. We request you to answer few questions 
required for the better understanding of our research. There will be no 
personal questions asked. For the confidentiality of your answers, the questions 
will be asked individually. At the end, we will give your participation fee and 
earnings of the experiment, if any.  
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Annexure (B): Photos of the experiment 
Picture 1 
Fake plastic currency used in the experiment 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
Picture 2 
Allotment of Unique ID 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
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Picture 3 
Task Based Endowment Stage 
 
 
 
Source: Photo taken by research guide with the participants consent. 
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Picture 4 
Sample sheet used for the experiment 
Total earnings 
Players Initial Endowment Lottery (Invest) Results Total Gains A B C D
A Nil
B Nil
C Nil
D Nil
Eliminate following amount of 
 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
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Picture 5 
Chits used for the lottery results 
 
 
Source: Photo taken by the author 
Picture 6 
Payment and questionnaire in anonymity 
 
Source: Photo taken by research guide with the participants consent. 
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Annexure (C): The questionnaire  
 
1. Sex   
o Male 
o Female 
2. Age 
o 18-24 
o 25-34 
o 35-44 
o 45-54 
o 55 and above 
 
3. Ability to read and write 
o Yes 
o No 
 
4. Highest level of education 
o Less than primary 
o Primary (8th) 
o Secondary (12th) 
o College/University 
o Technical/Vocational training 
o Post graduation (Masters/P.HD) 
o Others 
5. Employment status 
o Employed 
o Self Employed / Employer 
o Part time employed 
o Retired 
o Not employed, looking for work 
o Not employed, Not looking for work 
6. Occupation  
o Service – Private  
o Service – Government  
o Business 
o Housewives/Homemaker 
o Daily wage labourers 
o Seasonal labourers 
o Finance/Bankers 
o Academic researchers/Researchers/Teachers 
o Contributing family workers 
o Others – Please mention 
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7. Marital Status  
o Single, never married 
o Married  
o Divorced/Widowed 
 
8. Family Size 
o Two or less 
o More than two 
o Four or more 
 
9. Religion 
o Hindu 
o Muslim 
o Christian 
o Catholic 
o Buddhist 
o Jainism 
o Sikhism 
o Atheist 
o Agnostic 
o Non-religious 
o Others (please specify) 
   
Questionnaire on Experiment and Demonetization 
1. Did you understand the experiment completely? 
 
2. What motivated your choice in the last stage of the experiment? 
 
 
3. What do you think motivated the choice of other players? 
 
4. Do you support the demonetisation policy when it was first an-
nounced? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o I have no opinion 
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If yes, please explain why (briefly)? 
 
If no, please explain why (briefly)?  
 
5. Do you still think (after 9 months) demonetisation was a good/useful 
policy? 
 
o Yes  
o No 
o I have no opinion 
 
If yes, please explain why?  
 
If not, please explain why?  
 
 
6. Did you suffer any monetary loss due to demonetization? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
7. Do you have any personal experience with demonetization affecting the 
black money of anyone you know?  
 
o Yes 
o No 
8. Did you face inconvenience by standing in the ATM or bank queues? 
 
o Yes 
o No 
To be filled by me.  
o Location of the experiment 
o Time 
o Date 
o Duration of the session 
o Kind of groups involved 
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Annexure (D):  Structure of the data  
 
id player session endowment bet earnings burning buring against* nogift otherplayer_nogift interaction
S1A 1 1 200 50 550 0 B 0 1 0
S1A 1 1 200 50 550 0 C 0 0 0
S1A 1 1 200 50 550 0 D 0 1 0
S1B 2 1 150 100 250 0 A 1 0 0
S1B 2 1 150 100 250 0 C 1 0 0
S1B 2 1 150 100 250 0 D 1 1 1
S1C 3 1 300 100 700 0 A 0 0 0
S1C 3 1 300 100 700 0 B 0 1 0
S1C 3 1 300 100 700 0 D 0 1 0
S1D 4 1 100 50 150 0 A 1 0 0
S1D 4 1 100 50 150 0 B 1 1 1
S1D 4 1 100 50 150 0 C 1 0 0
S2A 1 2 300 200 400 0 B 0 1 0
S2A 1 2 300 200 400 0 C 0 0 0
S2A 1 2 300 200 400 0 D 0 1 0
S2B 2 2 200 100 300 0 A 1 0 0
S2B 2 2 200 100 300 0 C 1 0 0
S2B 2 2 200 100 300 0 D 1 1 1
S2C 3 2 100 100 300 0 A 0 0 0
S2C 3 2 100 100 300 0 B 0 1 0
S2C 3 2 100 100 300 0 D 0 1 0
S2D 4 2 150 50 100 300 A 1 0 0
S2D 4 2 150 50 100 50 B 1 1 1
S2D 4 2 150 50 100 50 C 1 0 0
* Column in red is added in this data structure to indicate the coding of variable otherplayer_nogift. 
 
    Note: The socio-economic and game related indicators in the data are excluded in this sample format. 
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Annexure (E): Data characteristics 
Table A 
Characteristics of data collection 
Criteria Description 
Data 50 sessions and 4 participants in each session. 
Period July 20th to August 21st, 2017 
Location Urban: New Delhi, Gurugram, Noida – India 
Rural: Village - Shahpur Jamal, Biharipur, Hasanpur, Afzalgarh, Nadehi, 
KasampurGarhi, Barkatpur, Macchmar, SarkaraKhedi – Uttar Pradesh, 
India 
Actors (2) Male and Female 
Days and Hour Days – Both weekday and weekend (depending on the participants 
availability) 
Hour – Anytime between 08:00 am and 10:00 pm (depending on the 
participants availability) 
Research 
Assistance 
Rural: One research guide 
Urban: Two research assistance 
Climate Mostly hot and humid 
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Table B 
Location details for the rural sample 
Number  
of  
Sessions 
Location Extra Notes  Disturbance Level 
6 Empty room of a fuel 
station – Location was in 
(less than) 5 minutes of 
walking distance from 
the nearby village. 
The room was spacious with 
table chairs and a cot setting. 
Participants from the nearby 
villages were requested to 
come till that location. 
Very less noise 
4 Empty room of a different 
fuel station -Location 
was in (less than) 5-10 
minutes of walking dis-
tance from the nearby 
village. 
The room was a little 
cramped but allowed 4 chairs 
and a table setting.  
Some noise 
3 Garage like space Used for storing oil. Had the 
space to accommodate 4 
chairs and a small table. 
Some noise. Mainly 
due to the gathering 
of people. 
3 Sugar-Mill Compound In one of the offices of the 
employees with table and 
chair setting. 
No noise 
2 School compound Evening sessions when the 
school was closed. 
No noise 
2 Small open (balcony) 
space 
On the floor (concrete) Some noise. Mainly 
due to the gathering 
of few people. 
2 Small rice-mill compound 
– Parking area.  
In an open entry space with 
table and chairs setting. 
No noise 
2 Inside a (small) shop in 
the village 
Lunch sessions when the 
shopkeeper was not expect-
ing any customer. The space 
was a little cramped.  
Very less noise 
2 Dera – a very small 
farmhouse in between 
farms 
Table and cot setting. Some noise. Mainly 
due to the gathering 
of nearby farmers. 
Source: Authors design 
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Table C 
Location details for the urban sample 
Number  
of  
Sessions 
Location Extra Notes  Disturbance Level 
3 Living room of a 
participant’s house. 
Session with housewives.  
Table and chair setting.  
No noise. 
2 Basement of a 
house. 
Little cramped setting but 
had space for two chairs and 
a small single narrow bed. 
Little noise from the 
moving traffic.  
2 Houses under con-
struction. 
Lunch sessions when the 
workers were on a break. 
Very less noise. 
Mostly of the mov-
ing traffic outside. 
3 Living room of a 
participant’s house. 
Session with housewives. 
Table and chair setting. 
No noise. 
2 Basement of a shop  
(storage area) 
On the floor. No noise. 
2 Inside a shop Lunch session when the 
shopkeeper was not expect-
ing any customer. 
Very less noise. 
Mainly of the mov-
ing traffic outside. 
1 Guard-house A little cramped space but 
allowed a setting of four 
chairs. 
No noise. 
1 Public Park On the ground Some noise. Mainly 
because of the 
gathering of people. 
1 Balcony (of a house) On the floor (concrete) No noise. 
2 Room (in a working 
employees hostel) 
Chair and small bed setting. No noise 
1 Garden area On the ground Very less noise.  
2 Office compound In the open free space. On 
the ground setting 
Less noise due to 
the closed complex. 
2 In a room Table and chair setting No noise 
Source: Authors design 
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Annexure (F): Econometric results  
Table A 
Average effect of treatment on burning (col. 2, 4, 6) 
The Average Effect of Not Receiving Gift on the Burning  
 
Results of Equation 1 
 
  (2) (4) (6) 
No Gift 47.167*** 0.159**  10.474*** 
 
(8.427)    (0.054)    (2.118)    
    
Location 6.667*** 0.667*** 15.732*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
1.session -75.000*** -0.250*** -11.688*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
2.session -41.667*** 0.000    -2.661*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
3.session 16.667*** 0.167*** 5.051*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
4.session -26.667*** 0.417*** 0.488*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
5.session -12.500*** 0.250*** 4.518*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
6.session -14.583*** 0.500*** 3.627*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
7.session -30.833*** 0.250*** -5.037*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
8.session -30.833*** 0.417*** 5.812*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
13.session -67.083*** 0.000    -9.347*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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14.session -32.083*** 0.500*** 4.540*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
15.session -40.833*** 0.250*** -2.224*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
17.session 25.000*** 0.083*** 4.337*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
18.session -50.000*** 0.000    -7.244*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
19.session -8.333*** 0.250*** 10.534*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
20.session -75.000*** -0.250*** -11.688*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
21.session -41.667*** -0.083*** -1.966*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
22.session -12.500*** 0.167*** 4.504*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
23.session -66.667*** -0.167*** -9.605*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
24.session 0.000    0.000    0.000    
 
(.)    (.)    (.)    
    
25.session -31.667*** -0.500*** -6.230*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
26.session -55.833*** -0.417*** -17.632*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
27.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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28.session -13.333*** -0.417*** -5.923*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
    
29.session -50.000*** -0.583*** -17.148*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
30.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
31.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
32.session 75.417*** -0.417*** 7.778*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
33.session -77.500*** -0.833*** -26.379*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
34.session -19.167*** -0.500*** -12.606*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
35.session -56.667*** -0.750*** -21.518*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
36.session Reference Reference Reference 
    
    
37.session 19.167*** -0.417*** -4.504*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
38.session -79.583*** -0.833*** -27.024*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
39.session -26.667*** -0.417*** -15.825*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
40.session -39.167*** -0.667*** -15.873*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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41.session -27.500*** -0.500*** -13.393*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
    
42.session -15.000*** -0.583*** -6.786*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
43.session -73.333*** -0.833*** -25.337*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
44.session -40.000*** -0.583*** -16.310*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
45.session -31.667*** -0.667*** -11.448*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
46.session 18.333*** -0.583*** -3.810*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
47.session 18.333*** -0.167*** -3.016*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
48.session -44.167*** -0.417*** -11.021*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
49.session 14.167*** -0.333*** -0.594*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
50.session -23.333*** -0.667*** -10.754*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
_cons 44.750*** -0.496*** -9.281*** 
 
(4.214)    (0.027)    (1.059)    
    
N 540 540 540 
R Squared 0.0693 0.2522 0.1975 
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Table B 
Average effect of treatment on burning (col. 3, 5 and 7) 
The Average Effect of Not Receiving Gift on the Burning  
 
Results of Equation 1 
   (3) (5) (7) 
No Gift 44.042*** 0.178**  9.921*** 
 
(9.861)    (0.058)    (2.352)    
    
Gender[M=1/F=0] -43.087    -0.261    -12.464    
 
(46.612)    (0.298)    (12.911)    
    
Literacy [Y=1/N=0] 17.634    0.041    2.088    
 
(46.715)    (0.185)    (11.956)    
    
Age 
   
18-24 Reference Reference Reference 
    
25-34 48.336    0.282    13.609*   
 
(25.215)    (0.143)    (6.639)    
    
35-44 64.158    0.280    12.897    
 
(33.347)    (0.163)    (8.291)    
    
45-54 46.967    0.170    11.673    
 
(33.939)    (0.189)    (9.259)    
    
55 and above 94.204*   0.498*   27.909*   
 
(38.066)    (0.216)    (11.352)    
    
Education 
   
Less than Primary Reference Reference Reference 
    
Primary -22.452    -0.070    -9.754    
 
(24.453)    (0.151)    (7.544)    
    
Secondary -44.089    -0.198    -15.932*   
 
(22.720)    (0.116)    (6.407)    
    
College -42.079    -0.165    -16.299*   
 
(24.494)    (0.154)    (7.596)    
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Post Graduation -64.280    -0.266    -20.967*   
 
(37.363)    (0.208)    (10.092)    
    
Others -2.740    0.220    -1.309    
 
(54.739)    (0.343)    (14.823)    
    
Employment 
   
Full time employed Reference Reference Reference 
    
Self Employed 52.444    0.397    16.711    
 
(47.234)    (0.252)    (12.341)    
    
Part time employed -44.451    -0.176    -13.520    
 
(50.183)    (0.202)    (12.470)    
    
Retired -31.013    -0.224    -11.344    
 
(39.726)    (0.186)    (8.783)    
    
Not Employed -73.969    -0.136    -14.557    
 
(62.101)    (0.300)    (15.136)    
    
Occupation 
   
Housewives Reference Reference Reference 
    
Daily wage Labourer 16.093    -0.405    1.200    
 
(86.004)    (0.373)    (20.944)    
    
Seasonal Labourer 32.665    -0.389    0.908    
 
(97.758)    (0.451)    (25.213)    
    
Service-Private 15.392    -0.334    1.543    
 
(101.830)    (0.396)    (21.898)    
    
Business -63.297    -0.743    -32.671    
 
(90.379)    (0.452)    (21.725)    
    
Contributing family workers 5.433    -0.195    -6.890    
 
(113.661)    (0.492)    (25.961)    
    
Others 8.933    -0.363    -4.277    
 
(93.527)    (0.349)    (19.760)    
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Marital Status 
   
Single Reference Reference Reference 
    
Married -37.161    -0.054    -12.417    
 
(24.650)    (0.152)    (7.505)    
    
Divorced -83.460**  -0.276    -30.345**  
 
(30.665)    (0.187)    (9.466)    
    
Family Size 
   
Two or less Reference Reference Reference 
    
More than two -0.313    -0.069    1.140    
 
(26.862)    (0.196)    (6.702)    
    
Four or more -3.545    -0.087    0.451    
 
(28.475)    (0.210)    (7.065)    
    
Religion 
   
Hindu Reference Reference Reference 
    
Muslim 16.694    0.256    3.896    
 
(23.740)    (0.166)    (6.753)    
    
Sikhism 17.228    0.272    5.676    
 
(30.651)    (0.152)    (6.585)    
    
Others -34.111    0.175    -3.059    
 
(19.626)    (0.135)    (5.545)    
    
Location 52.323    0.657    22.016    
 
(78.492)    (0.400)    (19.184)    
    
1.session -28.485    -0.772*   -12.750    
 
(76.237)    (0.370)    (17.355)    
    
2.session 6.742    -0.426    -0.223    
 
(77.977)    (0.390)    (17.575)    
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3.session 70.822    -0.295    9.844    
 
(77.697)    (0.371)    (16.934)    
    
    
4.session -4.880    -0.381    -8.341    
 
(80.185)    (0.445)    (18.603)    
    
5.session -56.410    0.139    -10.416    
 
(56.057)    (0.170)    (8.653)    
    
6.session -37.721    0.474**  -5.880    
 
(57.881)    (0.165)    (7.850)    
    
7.session -36.523    0.304    -14.106    
 
(69.772)    (0.199)    (10.363)    
    
8.session -42.070    0.528*   1.523    
 
(60.300)    (0.218)    (9.527)    
    
13.session -91.536*   -0.250    -18.284    
 
(39.961)    (0.273)    (10.451)    
    
14.session -26.554*   0.542*** 6.707    
 
(12.852)    (0.076)    (3.421)    
    
15.session -38.452**  0.297*** 0.293    
 
(12.909)    (0.078)    (3.373)    
    
17.session 70.181    -0.393    6.537    
 
(73.469)    (0.352)    (15.676)    
    
18.session -36.723    -0.045    8.244    
 
(51.865)    (0.302)    (10.543)    
    
19.session -29.304    0.124    4.248    
 
(20.586)    (0.132)    (6.282)    
    
20.session -71.004    -0.268    1.808    
 
(52.691)    (0.294)    (10.583)    
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21.session -34.945    -0.130    10.382    
 
(50.529)    (0.279)    (9.593)    
    
22.session 8.086    0.168    20.221*   
 
(46.009)    (0.264)    (8.156)    
    
    
23.session -107.168**  -0.306    -26.448**  
 
(33.423)    (0.228)    (9.590)    
    
24.session Reference Reference Reference 
    
25.session -110.283    -0.673    -21.765    
 
(90.362)    (0.441)    (21.950)    
    
26.session -66.570    -0.914*   -27.750    
 
(89.659)    (0.367)    (18.556)    
    
27.session -165.675*   -1.202**  -45.225*   
 
(80.440)    (0.441)    (20.333)    
    
28.session -9.249    -0.203    -4.219    
 
(91.477)    (0.437)    (20.565)    
    
29.session -105.761    -0.788    -16.381    
 
(99.971)    (0.512)    (22.862)    
    
30.session -134.469    -0.974*   -32.041    
 
(86.780)    (0.444)    (20.969)    
   
0.134    
31.session -81.187    -1.427*** -36.279*   
 
(78.532)    (0.314)    (15.439)    
    
32.session 47.428    -0.380    2.707    
 
(61.948)    (0.344)    (16.081)    
    
33.session -119.365    -0.829*   -32.162    
 
(72.665)    (0.390)    (18.234)    
    
34.session -73.969    -0.523    -23.115    
 
(91.250)    (0.390)    (20.029)    
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35.session -119.385    -0.841    -32.213    
 
(83.510)    (0.444)    (20.567)    
    
36.session Reference Reference Reference 
    
37.session -110.567    -1.029*   -32.811    
 
(79.097)    (0.451)    (19.883)    
    
38.session -118.844    -0.762    -31.748    
 
(76.118)    (0.396)    (18.683)    
    
39.session -85.084    -0.411    -23.367    
 
(83.926)    (0.436)    (20.418)    
    
40.session -99.247    -0.966*   -19.349    
 
(84.091)    (0.466)    (19.443)    
    
41.session -115.564    -0.783    -32.066    
 
(84.231)    (0.439)    (20.878)    
    
42.session -59.310    -0.445    -15.797    
 
(93.844)    (0.417)    (20.882)    
    
43.session -130.922    -0.854*   -34.885    
 
(83.103)    (0.420)    (20.262)    
    
44.session -100.074    -0.638    -28.411    
 
(85.005)    (0.378)    (18.407)    
    
45.session -124.555    -1.016*   -26.833    
 
(83.807)    (0.448)    (20.483)    
    
46.session -65.288    -0.791    -16.333    
 
(90.098)    (0.411)    (20.265)    
    
47.session -35.274    -0.724    -26.553    
 
(85.476)    (0.360)    (17.657)    
    
48.session -107.760    -0.476    -24.277    
 
(80.086)    (0.444)    (20.253)    
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49.session -29.596    -0.189    -0.620    
 
(105.694)    (0.501)    (23.264)    
    
50.session -145.318    -1.126*   -37.247    
 
(85.245)    (0.467)    (21.514)    
    
_cons 41.998    0.104    9.552    
 
(124.311)    (0.703)    (28.739)    
    
N 540 540 540 
R Squared 0.2911 0.3345 0.288 
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Table C 
Effect of interactions on burning (col. 2, 4 and 6) 
The Average Effect of Interactions between the Players on the Burning  
Equation 2 estimates 
    
  Column (2) Column (4) 
Column 
(6) 
No Gift [1/0] 46.361**  0.083    10.364**  
 
(13.978)    (0.073)    (3.167)    
    
Other player - No Gift [1/0] -38.639*** -0.261*** -5.769*   
 
(8.408)    (0.048)    (2.382)    
    
No Gift # Other player - No Gift -36.222*   -0.033    -5.440    
 
(15.149)    (0.082)    (4.513)    
    
Location 6.667*** 0.667*** 15.732*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
1.session -75.000*** -0.250*** -11.688*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
2.session -41.667*** 0.000    -2.661*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
3.session 16.667*** 0.167*** 5.051*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
4.session -26.667*** 0.417*** 0.488*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
5.session -12.500*** 0.250*** 4.518*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
6.session -14.583*** 0.500*** 3.627*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
7.session -30.833*** 0.250*** -5.037*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
8.session -30.833*** 0.417*** 5.812*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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13.session -67.083*** 0.000    -9.347*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
14.session -32.083*** 0.500*** 4.540*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
15.session -40.833*** 0.250*** -2.224*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
17.session 25.000*** 0.083*** 4.337*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
18.session -50.000*** 0.000    -7.244*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
19.session -8.333*** 0.250*** 10.534*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
20.session -75.000*** -0.250*** -11.688*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
21.session -41.667*** -0.083*** -1.966*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
22.session -12.500*** 0.167*** 4.504*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
23.session -66.667*** -0.167*** -9.605*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
24.session 0.000    0.000    0.000    
 
(.)    (.)    (.)    
    
25.session -31.667*** -0.500*** -6.230*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
26.session -55.833*** -0.417*** -17.632*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
27.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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28.session -13.333*** -0.417*** -5.923*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
29.session -50.000*** -0.583*** -17.148*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
30.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
31.session -81.667*** -0.917*** -27.421*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
32.session 75.417*** -0.417*** 7.778*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
33.session -77.500*** -0.833*** -26.379*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
34.session -19.167*** -0.500*** -12.606*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
35.session -56.667*** -0.750*** -21.518*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
36.session Reference Reference Reference 
    
37.session 19.167*** -0.417*** -4.504*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
38.session -79.583*** -0.833*** -27.024*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
39.session -26.667*** -0.417*** -15.825*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
40.session -39.167*** -0.667*** -15.873*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
41.session -27.500*** -0.500*** -13.393*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
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42.session -15.000*** -0.583*** -6.786*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
43.session -73.333*** -0.833*** -25.337*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
44.session -40.000*** -0.583*** -16.310*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
45.session -31.667*** -0.667*** -11.448*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
46.session 18.333*** -0.583*** -3.810*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
47.session 18.333*** -0.167*** -3.016*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
48.session -44.167*** -0.417*** -11.021*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
49.session 14.167*** -0.333*** -0.594*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
50.session -23.333*** -0.667*** -10.754*** 
 
(0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    
    
_cons 70.509*** -0.322*** -5.435**  
 
(7.434)    (0.042)    (1.728)    
    
    
N 540.000    540.000    540.000    
R Squared 0.3169 0.3268 0.2317 
     
74 
 
Table D 
Effect of interactions on burning (col. 3, 5 and 7) 
The Average Effect of Interactions between the Players on the Burning  
Equation 2 estimates 
  Column(3) Column (5) Column (7) 
    
No Gift [1/0] 43.237**  0.102    9.811**  
 
(15.287)    (0.077)    (3.528)    
    
Other player - No Gift [1/0] -38.639*** -0.261*** -5.769*   
 
(8.658)    (0.050)    (2.453)    
    
No Gift # Other player - No Gift -36.222*   -0.033    -5.440    
 
(15.599)    (0.084)    (4.647)    
    
Gender[M=1/F=0] -43.087    -0.261    -12.464    
 
(46.712)    (0.299)    (12.939)    
    
Literacy [Y=1/N=0] 17.634    0.041    2.088    
 
(46.816)    (0.186)    (11.982)    
    
Age 
   
18-24 Reference Reference Reference 
    
25-34 48.336    0.282    13.609*   
 
(25.270)    (0.144)    (6.653)    
    
35-44 64.158    0.280    12.897    
 
(33.419)    (0.163)    (8.309)    
    
45-54 46.967    0.170    11.673    
 
(34.012)    (0.190)    (9.279)    
    
55 and above 94.204*   0.498*   27.909*   
 
(38.148)    (0.217)    (11.377)    
    
Education 
   
Less than Primary Reference Reference Reference 
    
Primary -22.452    -0.070    -9.754    
 
(24.506)    (0.151)    (7.560)    
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Secondary -44.089    -0.198    -15.932*   
 
(22.769)    (0.117)    (6.421)    
    
College -42.079    -0.165    -16.299*   
 
(24.546)    (0.154)    (7.612)    
    
Post Graduation -64.280    -0.266    -20.967*   
 
(37.443)    (0.209)    (10.114)    
    
Others -2.740    0.220    -1.309    
 
(54.857)    (0.343)    (14.855)    
    
Employment 
   
Full time employed Reference Reference Reference 
    
Self Employed 52.444    0.397    16.711    
 
(47.336)    (0.253)    (12.368)    
    
Part time employed -44.451    -0.176    -13.520    
 
(50.291)    (0.202)    (12.497)    
    
Retired -31.013    -0.224    -11.344    
 
(39.811)    (0.186)    (8.802)    
    
Not Employed -73.969    -0.136    -14.557    
 
(62.234)    (0.301)    (15.168)    
    
Occupation 
   
Housewives Reference Reference Reference 
    
Daily wage Labourer 16.093    -0.405    1.200    
 
(86.190)    (0.373)    (20.989)    
    
Seasonal Labourer 32.665    -0.389    0.908    
 
(97.968)    (0.452)    (25.267)    
    
Service-Private 15.392    -0.334    1.543    
 
(102.049)    (0.397)    (21.945)    
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Business -63.297    -0.743    -32.671    
 
(90.573)    (0.453)    (21.772)    
    
    
Contributing family workers 5.433    -0.195    -6.890    
 
(113.906)    (0.493)    (26.017)    
    
Others 8.933    -0.363    -4.277    
 
(93.728)    (0.350)    (19.803)    
    
Marital Status 
   
Single Reference Reference Reference 
    
Married -37.161    -0.054    -12.417    
 
(24.703)    (0.152)    (7.521)    
    
Divorced -83.460**  -0.276    -30.345**  
 
(30.731)    (0.188)    (9.486)    
    
Family Size 
   
Two or less Reference Reference Reference 
    
More than two -0.313    -0.069    1.140    
 
(26.919)    (0.196)    (6.717)    
    
Four or more -3.545    -0.087    0.451    
 
(28.536)    (0.210)    (7.080)    
    
Religion 
   
Hindu Reference Reference Reference 
    
Muslim 16.694    0.256    3.896    
 
(23.791)    (0.166)    (6.767)    
    
Sikhism 17.228    0.272    5.676    
 
(30.717)    (0.152)    (6.599)    
    
Others -34.111    0.175    -3.059    
 
(19.668)    (0.135)    (5.557)    
    
Location 52.323    0.657    22.016    
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(78.661)    (0.401)    (19.225)    
    
1.session -28.485    -0.772*   -12.750    
 
(76.401)    (0.371)    (17.393)    
    
    
2.session 6.742    -0.426    -0.223    
 
(78.145)    (0.391)    (17.613)    
    
3.session 70.822    -0.295    9.844    
 
(77.865)    (0.371)    (16.970)    
    
4.session -4.880    -0.381    -8.341    
 
(80.358)    (0.446)    (18.643)    
    
5.session -56.410    0.139    -10.416    
 
(56.178)    (0.170)    (8.672)    
    
6.session -37.721    0.474**  -5.880    
 
(58.006)    (0.165)    (7.867)    
    
7.session -36.523    0.304    -14.106    
 
(69.922)    (0.200)    (10.385)    
    
8.session -42.070    0.528*   1.523    
 
(60.430)    (0.218)    (9.548)    
    
13.session -91.536*   -0.250    -18.284    
 
(40.047)    (0.273)    (10.474)    
    
14.session -26.554*   0.542*** 6.707    
 
(12.879)    (0.076)    (3.428)    
    
15.session -38.452**  0.297*** 0.293    
 
(12.937)    (0.078)    (3.380)    
    
17.session 70.181    -0.393    6.537    
 
(73.627)    (0.353)    (15.709)    
    
18.session -36.723    -0.045    8.244    
 
(51.977)    (0.303)    (10.565)    
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19.session -29.304    0.124    4.248    
 
(20.630)    (0.133)    (6.296)    
    
20.session -71.004    -0.268    1.808    
 
(52.804)    (0.294)    (10.606)    
    
    
21.session -34.945    -0.130    10.382    
 
(50.638)    (0.280)    (9.614)    
    
22.session 8.086    0.168    20.221*   
 
(46.108)    (0.264)    (8.174)    
    
23.session -107.168**  -0.306    -26.448**  
 
(33.495)    (0.229)    (9.611)    
    
24.session 0.000    0.000    0.000    
 
(.)    (.)    (.)    
 
.    .    .    
25.session -110.283    -0.673    -21.765    
 
(90.557)    (0.442)    (21.998)    
    
26.session -66.570    -0.914*   -27.750    
 
(89.852)    (0.368)    (18.596)    
    
27.session -165.675*   -1.202**  -45.225*   
 
(80.613)    (0.441)    (20.376)    
    
28.session -9.249    -0.203    -4.219    
 
(91.674)    (0.438)    (20.610)    
    
29.session -105.761    -0.788    -16.381    
 
(100.186)    (0.513)    (22.911)    
    
30.session -134.469    -0.974*   -32.041    
 
(86.967)    (0.445)    (21.015)    
    
31.session -81.187    -1.427*** -36.279*   
 
(78.701)    (0.314)    (15.472)    
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32.session 47.428    -0.380    2.707    
 
(62.081)    (0.345)    (16.116)    
    
33.session -119.365    -0.829*   -32.162    
 
(72.821)    (0.391)    (18.273)    
    
34.session -73.969    -0.523    -23.115    
 
(91.447)    (0.391)    (20.072)    
    
    
35.session -119.385    -0.841    -32.213    
 
(83.690)    (0.445)    (20.611)    
36.session Reference Reference Reference 
    
37.session -110.567    -1.029*   -32.811    
 
(79.268)    (0.452)    (19.926)    
    
38.session -118.844    -0.762    -31.748    
 
(76.282)    (0.396)    (18.723)    
    
39.session -85.084    -0.411    -23.367    
 
(84.106)    (0.436)    (20.462)    
    
40.session -99.247    -0.966*   -19.349    
 
(84.272)    (0.467)    (19.485)    
    
41.session -115.564    -0.783    -32.066    
 
(84.412)    (0.440)    (20.923)    
    
42.session -59.310    -0.445    -15.797    
 
(94.046)    (0.418)    (20.927)    
    
43.session -130.922    -0.854*   -34.885    
 
(83.282)    (0.421)    (20.305)    
    
44.session -100.074    -0.638    -28.411    
 
(85.188)    (0.378)    (18.447)    
    
45.session -124.555    -1.016*   -26.833    
 
(83.987)    (0.449)    (20.527)    
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46.session -65.288    -0.791    -16.333    
 
(90.292)    (0.412)    (20.309)    
    
47.session -35.274    -0.724    -26.553    
 
(85.660)    (0.361)    (17.695)    
    
48.session -107.760    -0.476    -24.277    
 
(80.258)    (0.445)    (20.297)    
    
49.session -29.596    -0.189    -0.620    
 
(105.922)    (0.502)    (23.314)    
    
    
50.session -145.318    -1.126*   -37.247    
 
(85.429)    (0.468)    (21.560)    
    
_cons 67.757    0.278    13.398    
 
(126.548)    (0.711)    (29.162)    
    
N 540.000    540.000    540.000    
R Squared 0.3893 0.4091 0.3230 
Source: data gathered by author 
 
 
